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ABSTRACT 
 
The Zimbabwe Electricity Supply (ESI) reforms of 2002 were primarily meant to improve the 
quantity and quality of electricity supply through encouraging private participation, especially 
in generation, introducing regulation and competition and restructuring the utility. The reforms 
have not yielded the expected results, two decades on. This research explores the reform process 
and the extent to which it is structured to encourage private investments. The research approach 
used was primarily qualitative, based on survey research and expert interviews as well as 
longitudinal power sector performance data. The research found that a transitional ESI structure 
was adopted to deal with legacy debt issues, as well as to allow the different companies time to 
develop to a level where they can commercially trade. The regulator was found to be fairly 
independent, with a good licensing framework and tariff methodology. However, the off-taker’s 
tariff is below cost, though IPPs have been awarded cost reflective tariff and largely view the 
tariff methodology as acceptable. Only small IPPs have been able to commission their projects, 
with the larger ones failing to reach financial closure. This has not helped some of the objectives 
of the reform, as the installed capacity in the country remains below demand. The reforms 
proposed in the Electricity Act of 2013, meant to further restructure the utility, have not been 
implemented as the government felt that the conditions in the country were not yet conducive 
for the generation, transmission and distribution companies to be spun out of ZESA Holdings. 
 
The research concluded that the reforms managed to improve the attractiveness of the industry 
to investment, though only small IPPs managed to commission their projects, leaving a large 
demand-supply gap. It is recommended that further study be done to establish conditions 
necessary for further restructuring of the sector as this may be the panacea for unlocking bigger 
projects which will have an impact on improving the quantity and quality of power supply. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2002, Zimbabwe initiated market-based power sector reforms, with the revision of the 1985 
Electricity Act (previously revised in 1996). Through encouraging private participation, 
introducing regulation and competition and restructuring the utility, reformers hoped to 
improve the quantity and quality of supply as well as to increase electricity access, to support 
economic growth and development (Zimbabwe, 2002). However, reforms have not unfolded 
as expected. Now, more than two decades since the inception of reforms, Zimbabwe continues 
to face many of the same challenges. Critically, installed generation capacity remains 
stubbornly below demand, the quality and reliability of electricity services are low, and 
increasing access remains a priority.  
In this dissertation, I explore the relationship between power sector reforms and power sector 
development. Specifically, I investigate the manner and extent to which reforms have 
contributed to attracting private sector participation and investment in generation. The research 
approach adopted is primarily qualitative, based on survey research and expert interviews, 
though it includes some analysis of longitudinal power sector performance indicators. 
Through this introductory chapter, the background, rationale, problem statement and objectives 
of the research are charted. Following from this, the research design is relayed. The chapter 
concludes with a chapter summary, thus providing the reader with an overview of the 
dissertation’s structure. 
1.1 Background of the study 
1.1.1 Institutional Structure and Reforms 
At Independence in 1980, the ESI in Zimbabwe comprised the Central African Power 
Corporation (CAPCO), the Electricity Supply Commission (ESC) and the Electricity 
Departments of the cities of Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare and Gweru. CAPCO was jointly owned 
by the Zimbabwean and Zambian governments, and was responsible for the generation and 
transmission of electricity to the two countries from the Kariba hydroelectric power stations 
situated at Kariba South and Kariba north. ESC was responsible for thermal generation at 
Hwange and Munyati thermal power stations, as well as the distribution of power throughout 
Zimbabwe outside the four main cities. Four municipal electricity departments owned by the 
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cities of Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare and Gweru were responsible for the provision of electricity 
in these cities (Dube, 1999). The cities of Harare and Bulawayo owned the Harare thermal 
power station, and Bulawayo thermal power respectively.   
The Electricity Act of 1985 led to the amalgamation of the five Zimbabwean owned utilities 
(ESC and the Electricity departments of Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare and Gweru) and the 
Zimbabwean share of CAPCO to form Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority (ZESA), a 
vertically integrated monopoly with the functions of generation, transmission and distribution 
of electricity (Kayo, 2002: 959).  ZESA was also responsible for centralised planning, which 
was meant to enable long-term investment efficiency based on least cost options (Kayo, 2002: 
959).  Kayo (2002) explains that the amalgamation was meant to bring a three-pronged 
economic advantage to the power sector in Zimbabwe, namely: 
(i) streamline the administration of the power sector through the ministry responsible for 
energy, 
(ii) achieve efficiencies through economies of scale, and 
(iii) remove duplication of functions among the utilities. 
By the 1990s, however, the performance of the integrated utility was deteriorating. Energy sent 
out declined from 9,361.5GWh in 1990 to 6,995.8GWh in 2000 and total imports increased 
from 332.4GWh to 5,094.5GWh in the same period (ZESA, 2000). Total system losses 
increased from 8.7% to 13.2% from 1990 to 2000 on the backdrop of stagnant installed 
capacity, while maximum demand peaked at 2,034MW in 1999 - up from 1,573.9MW in 1990 
(ZESA, 2000). Access to electricity saw some improvement, growing from 27% to 34% 
between 1996 and 1999 (World Bank, 2003).   
It became clear that advancing socio-economic development depended on drastically 
improving the reliability and availability of electricity services, as well as increasing electricity 
access. The Zimbabwean government thus decided to institute electricity sector reforms, in 
order to address underinvestment in and the progressive deterioration of electricity 
infrastructure and services (Zimbabwe, 2000). The revision of the Electricity Act in 1996 had 
failed to attract private capital, as it required any IPP with capacity of more than 100kW to be 
approved by ZESA and the relevant ministry (Kayo, 2002). This framework was not conducive 
for private sector investment (Mangwengwende, 2005), as the off-taker was given the 
regulating powers over the supplier. Investors would not put a significant amount of money 
where the buyer of their product regulates the market. Experience in other countries in the 
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region has shown that private investors require clarity of policy framework which is defined 
by transparent, consistent and fair regulation. This has to be aligned with credible industry 
structure where the creditworthiness of the off-taker is ensured for guaranteed revenue streams 
(Eberhard, Gratwick, Morella and Antmann, 2016). This was one of the rationales behind 
instituting reforms. 
In 2000, the Minister of Mines and Energy signed the Electricity White Paper, providing the 
foundation for power sector reform going forward (Zimbabwe, 2000). This led to the review 
of the Electricity Act, which resulted in the Electricity Act Chapter 13:19 of 2002 (Zimbabwe, 
2002). The Act paved the way for the unbundling of the vertically integrated utility ZESA into 
separate generation, transmission and distribution entities. It also made provision for the 
establishment of an independent regulator, the Zimbabwe Electricity Regulatory Commission 
(ZERC), (which was transformed to Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority (ZERA) in 2011) 
and the Rural Electrification Fund (Zimbabwe, 2002), which would focus on improving 
electricity access in rural areas. The 2011 merging of the electricity and petroleum regulation 
was meant to streamline costs by merging the two regulatory functions into energy regulation. 
The transmission and distribution companies were merged in 2008 after the government 
realized that the services they provided were similar (Kaseke, 2013). There were then cost 
savings in merging the two entities into one transmission and distribution company. In 2013, 
the government attempted to re-separate the transmission and distribution businesses as well 
as do away with ZESA Holdings through an Electricity Amendment Act. The President did not 
sign this into law as it was felt that the conditions were not yet ripe for industry subsidiaries to 
fully trade amongst each other with full responsibility over their legacy debt.  
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In figure 1.1 below, the current structure of the industry is presented.  
Figure 1.1 Overview of Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Industry 
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Due to partially implemented reforms, the Zimbabwean sector is an example of what Gratwick 
and Eberhard term a ‘hybrid model’, where private and public investment coexist in a sector 
that continues to be state-dominated (2008). In the next section, developments in sector 
performance under this structure are charted. 
1.1.2 Power Sector Performance 
The performance of the ESI can be tracked from the audited annual reports as from 2005 to 
2016 as indicated on figure 1.2 below. The graphical presentation of the operational statistics 
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below indicates that there was no significant improvement in the maximum demand over the 
period. Domestic production initially improved around 2009 but started going down after 2014. 
The continued significance of imports signifies the existence of a power demand-supply gap 
which could not be closed by improvement in local generation capacity. Zimbabwe has a 
diverse set of options for generation, including hydro, coal, and renewable energy sources. 
Over 8,000 MW in generation projects had been licensed by 2014 (ZERA, 2014), which 
indicates vast opportunities in power generation, and yet not significant amount of power has 
been commissioned yet. There has been load shedding at peak during the period under review 
but this did not catalyze financial closure on a significant number of power projects.  
Figure 1.2 Operational Statistics of ZETDC from 2005 - 2016 
 
Source: Compiled by author from Annual reports of 2005 to 2016 
The fact that the sponsors of 8,000 MW worth of projects went through the rigorous process to 
get licensed is indicative of the interest in investing in the ESI. However, failure to reach 
financial closure in an environment with opportunities shows limitations in the ability of the 
ESI to secure the much-needed capital. This raises questions around reforms and their impact 
on investment in the power sector. 
1.2 Problem definition 
It has been over a decade since these reforms were implemented and generation capacity has 
not increased in line with expectations. According to Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority 
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(ZERA) (2014), licenses in excess of 8,000 MW have been issued and yet the available capacity 
for the country remains below 2,000 MW (Zimbabwe Electricity Transmission and 
Distribution Company (ZETDC), 2014). While there are external socio-economic and political 
factors that may account for this, little research exists on the implementation and impact of 
power sector reform in Zimbabwe, specifically with regard to attracting necessary investment 
especially in generation.  
The Zimbabwean economy has been on a decline since 2000 when the government 
implemented reforms in the land tenure system. The economy, being agro based, suffered 
productive constraints which also affected downstream industries leading to stagnation in 
demand for electricity. Hyperinflation followed leading to the demonetization of the 
Zimbabwean Dollar in 2009. However, the demand supply gap remained with load shedding 
being the order of the day. The Southern African Power Pool lost excess capacity in 2007 
leading to constraints by member countries to get power imports. This created opportunities 
for development of power projects. However, financial close for major generation projects 
remained elusive.  
Power sector development in Zimbabwe hinges on attracting investment into generation 
infrastructure. This objective – attracting investment into generation - has been one of the core 
drivers of reform, yet little progress has been made over two decades. It is crucial to understand 
the underlying reasons for this failure, so as to advance better reforms and initiatives to advance 
investment in Zimbabwe’s power sector going forward. 
It is expected that the survey research will find that reforms did not adequately address the 
concerns of investors, including shortcomings associated with the regulatory environment of 
the ESI in Zimbabwe. 
The primary research question addressed in this dissertation thus asks: 
Have power sector reforms in Zimbabwe influenced investment in the power sector, 
specifically in generation, since 2002? 
Secondary questions include: 
(i) Did reforms adequately address the investor requirement for independence of the 
regulator in licensing, tariff methodology and award? 
(ii) How much power was added to the grid since the 2002 reforms were implemented? 
(iii) Has the public-sector power producer (ZESCO) managed to increase investment 
and power output after the reforms were implemented? 
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(iv) Has private sector investment and power output increased since reforms were 
implemented? 
(v) How does the performance of the off taker (ZESCO) impact investment by IPPs? 
(vi) Did any other factors affect the investment climate in the generation sector since 
2002? 
1.3 Research Objective   
The objective of the study is to investigate whether the reform of the Electricity Supply 
Industry in Zimbabwe has had any impact on investment in generation since 2002. 
The objective will be achieved through: 
- Establishing whether the reforms implemented in 2002 have been able to 
adequately address investor requirements for independence of the regulator in 
licensing, tariff methodology and tariff award. 
- Establishing whether the reforms implemented since 2002 have managed to attract 
significant private sector investment in the power sector 
- Establishing if there has been significant increase in power output following the 
reforms. 
- Assessing the impact of operations of the off takers on power sector investment by 
the IPPs 
- Interrogating whether the tariff methodology is favorable to private capital. 
- Identifying any other factors affecting the investment climate in the generation 
power sector since 2002 
1.4 Research Hypothesis 
The null hypothesis (H0) is: The reform of the Electricity Supply Industry in Zimbabwe 
has positively impacted investment in the power sector since 2002. 
The alternative hypothesis (H1) is: The reform of the Electricity Supply Industry in 
Zimbabwe has not had a significant impact on investment in the power sector since 2002. 
The alternative hypothesis is the research hypothesis (Keller, 2011) 
 
1.5 Research Design  
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Survey research will be used for the study. Questionnaires and interviews will be used to gather 
primary data. These two methods are used to enhance the response rate and clarity of questions 
during data gathering. The questionnaire will be administered among Independent Power 
Producers (IPPs) who are sampled according to categories set by the regulator in assessing 
their progress in setting up power plants. A questionnaire will also be administered to the public 
power producer, Zimbabwe Power Company (ZPC). In addition, interviews will be done on 
the same IPPs and ZPC, as well as banks that support infrastructure development in Zimbabwe. 
The off-taker, ZETDC, Ministry of Energy and Power Development (MoEPD) and the ZERA 
will also be interviewed. The questions posed are designed to investigate the impact of reforms 
on investment since 2002.  
1.6 Research constraints 
The economic environment has been deteriorating over the years. Performance of the ESI may 
then be difficult to attribute to the reform of the sector without regard to the wider environment. 
This may then compromise the conclusions derived from this study. An effort will be made 
during the survey for the respondents to isolate the impact of reforms on investment from the 
impact of the deteriorating economic environment. 
1.7 Research biases  
The researcher has extensive experience in the ESI and has been in the sector throughout the 
time of the reforms. There is a possibility of biased interpretation of results as a result. A mixed 
method approach will be employed to analyze both the qualitative and quantitative data 
concurrently to mitigate the impact of the possible biases.  
1.8 Justification of the study 
The development of the power sector in Zimbabwe will be achieved if the licensed generation 
projects were to be implemented. Ever since the reforms of 2002, there has been growth in 
electricity access while the development of generation capacity remained stagnant. This has 
led to increasing load shedding due to a widening electricity demand and supply gap. 
Investment in generation has been one of the core drivers of reform, yet little progress has been 
made over two decades. It is key to get a deeper understanding of the reasons behind this 
stagnation so as to better inform the further reforms that are necessary to improve the 
investment climate in the ESI in Zimbabwe. 
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1.9 Structure of the study 
The rest of the dissertation report will be structured as follows: 
Chapter two provides a review of the relevant literature. 
Chapter three details the methodology used to carry out the study. It also discusses the 
methodological concepts that guide the study, like research design, sample size, data collection 
and data presentation. 
In chapter four, the research findings are presented and analyzed. 
In chapter five, conclusions are drawn and discussed and recommendations for future research 
are made.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction: 
In order to understand the path, pace and progression of power sector reforms in Zimbabwe, it 
is crucial to consider the broader trend of market-based power sector reform that emerged in 
the 1980s and then spread across developed and developing countries alike throughout the 
1990s. These reforms were a response, in part, to the need for strategies to de-risking the 
environment surrounding the investment in power projects (ref). This chapter thus begins with 
an overview of the power sector investment theories as the basis to understand the criteria used 
by investors as they decide to invest. This is then followed by an analysis of what has become 
known as the ‘standard model’, a set of market-based reforms that have informed reform 
processes across developing countries. By the end of the 1990s, 70 developing countries had 
begun the process of reforming their power sectors in line with the standard model (Besant-
Jones, 2006). However, in the two decades since, reforms across these countries have not 
unfolded as expected (Nepal, Jamasb & Timilsina, 2015). This has led to a period of reappraisal 
among the development finance institutions who initially drove market-based reforms and the 
countries that initiated them. A review of this literature is presented in subsequent sections of 
this chapter. 
The Zimbabwean power sector and reform experience is then explored, with special attention 
to the generation segment of the ESI. With reference to the above review, the challenges of 
attracting investment and the relation between reforms and investment in Zimbabwe are 
considered. 
In the final section, I advance principal-agent theory as being of value in understanding the 
relationship between government, the power utilities, IPPs and electricity customers. In 
particular, the issue of information asymmetry and incentives are identified us useful in 
considering the challenges of attracting private investment in generation. 
2.2 Power Sector Investment theory 
Goetzmann (1996) describes investment theory as the body of knowledge that guides 
investment decision making. Power sector projects have several attributes which make 
investment decisions very unique in the way they are derived. Chief among them is the fact 
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that they are illiquid. This means that these projects are not easy to sell should the investor 
want to dispose of the assets and they cannot be easily converted into a different use without 
incurring significant costs. The development of the projects in normally through project finance 
structure which in itself is complicated because of the intricate interrelationship of different 
stakeholders through extensive contractual arrangements. They have long gestation periods 
such that it takes a long time before they start generating cash flow. These projects are also 
generally susceptible to political interference as governments take electricity supply to citizens 
as an indication of development (Ehlers, 2014) 
2.2.1 Factors affecting Power Sector Investment 
There is diverse literature on factors that impede investment in a particular economy. These 
barriers could be one or more of political, economic, social, technological and legal factors. 
World Bank (2013) explains that political and economic stability, governance, legal and 
regulatory environment, macroeconomic stability and strength of financial markets are 
particularly important in power project investment decision making. Allen & Overy (2009) 
discovered, in their research, that 90% of investors worry more about the conduciveness of the 
regulatory environment and rule of law in their choice of investment destinations. World Bank 
(2013) further observed that it is imperative to have a conducive political and regulatory 
environment for successful implementation of infrastructure projects given their sophisticated 
contractual arrangement and long gestation periods. It can therefore be deduced that the reform 
of the electricity sector is one of the important de-risking measures which are key to improve 
the attractiveness of the sector to investors. This research is endeavoring to assess the impact 
of the legal and regulatory reform of 2002 on the delivery of generation projects in Zimbabwe. 
2.2.2 Project Finance 
Project finance is increasingly being used by financial institutions to finance large 
infrastructure projects in developing countries with high risk profiles (Hainz & Kleimeier, 
2012). There are several merits to this development, chief among them being the use of SPV, 
the non-recourse nature of the funding structure and the intricate contractual nature of the 
arrangements. These merits allow funding to be raised outside the sponsors’ balance sheet 
(Denton Wilde Sapte, 2004) and on the merit of the project and its capability to create enough 
cash flows to repay the loan and giving a reasonable return. It then follows that sponsors are 
able to develop projects that are beyond their individual capacities both in terms of financing 
capacity and risk mitigation.  
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The traditional way of implementing projects by developing country governments has been 
corporate finance borrowing. In this financing structure, the assets of the electricity utility or 
government would be used to secure the borrowing. This brought limitations because of small 
balance sheets compared to the project being developed as well as high risk profiles of 
developing countries occasioned by poor governance and weak economic performance. This 
makes project finance a viable alternative that would see large projects being successfully 
developed for the betterment of the performance of weak economies. 
 
Below is a typical project finance structure. 
Fig 2.1 Typical Project Finance structure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Denton Wilde Sapte (2004): A Guide to Project Finance 
 
Project finance is relevant to Zimbabwe in the context of a broke government with great need 
for infrastructure projects like energy projects. It makes it possible to develop projects on their 
merits with project cash flows repaying debt. 
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2.3 Components of ESI and market models 
The ESI comprises different components which contribute different functions to the industry. 
The way these components are organized (under one company or different companies) and 
owned (private or public) determine the model under which the electricity market is being 
operated. The responsibility for investment will then be informed by the ownership (private or 
public) of the assets. Governments have increasingly wanted to have private sector 
participation in the electricity industry to augment dwindling national budgets which have to 
take care of other public infrastructure development requirements. 
Renner and Van Hertem (2014) define electric power system as a system that ‘generates 
electric energy and transports it from the generating units to the loads in a reliable and 
economic manner’. This definition means that the electric power system consists of generation, 
transmission, system operations, distribution and retail of power (Lambert, 2001). The different 
roles of the components of the electric power system are relayed below.  
Generation 
This component is responsible for the production of electricity. This production is done through 
different technologies, including thermal, hydro, solar, biomass, wind, etc. These technologies 
have different cost structures in the production of a unit of electricity (Hunt, 2002). This has 
implications on the procurement process of power, as the technology to be used for electricity 
production has to be specific. If the procurement is competitive, then different technologies 
have to compete on their own. A quota system then has to be in place to determine how much 
of what technology the grid should take. A country would have an Integrated Resource Plan 
(IRP) which stipulates the quotas according to the availability of resources in the country, and 
access to the relevant technologies to produce the energy. Other parameters specific to the 
particular technology have to be considered for the competitive bidding.  
Transmission 
This is the network of transmission lines and substations meant for the transportation of 
electricity which would have been generated at different sites in the country (Hunt, 2002). The 
transportation has to be at high voltage so as to reduce technical losses which are caused by the 
flow of high electric currents. The high voltages result in less current flow, thereby limiting 
technical losses. 
System Operations 
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This component is mandated with the matching of demand and supply of electricity on a real 
time basis. One attribute of electricity as a commodity is that it cannot be stored once produced. 
It also does not follow specific routes from the generation point to the consumer. It has to be 
consumed at the time of production. There is therefore a need to ascertain the demand on a 
continuous basis, and to match it with generation. This function is called dispatch. System 
operations use the transmission network to transfer power from generation sources to 
consumers connected on the distribution network on a real time basis (Hunt, 2002) 
Distribution 
The main function of this component is to transport electricity from transmission to consumers 
(Hunt, 2002). The overall electricity transfer system comprises the transmission and 
distribution components of the ESI, albeit at different voltages.  
Retail 
This concentrates on the commercial functions like metering, billing and revenue collection 
(Hunt, 2002). 
2.3.1  Power market models 
Market models explain the interrelationships of the different components of the industry. The 
common models according to Hunt (2002) are: (i) Vertically integrated, (ii) Single buyer, (iii) 
Open access and (iv)Retail competition. There is no correct or wrong model, as this is 
determined by the stage of development of the electricity market as well as government policy 
(Murray,1998). 
Vertically integrated ESI structure 
This is where all the components of the ESI are in the ownership of the state (Murray, 1998). 
‘From the beginning of electrification up to the 1980s vertically integrated monopoly utilities 
were managing the electric supply’ in most countries (Renner and Van Hertem, 2014:1179). 
This structure has served the industry for over a century (Hunt, 2002) but there is no 
competition, which can lead to inefficiencies and over-investment (Murray, 1998). It can, 
nevertheless, be argued that this structure brings efficiency in planning, as all functions are in 
one entity and there is closer coordination of planning activities. 
Single buyer 
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This is where generation is weaned off the vertically integrated utility and there is competition 
among many generation companies. The remaining, still integrated monopoly, is the only entity 
permitted to buy power from the competing generators (Hunt, 2002). In some cases, the single 
buyer is barred from owning its own generating power stations to avoid cases of conflict, where 
there will be a tendency to dispatch more of their own plants (Murray, 1998). This has been an 
important factor in the ESI reforms in Zimbabwe. 
Open access 
The power generation market in this instance is open to the distribution companies, as well as 
large electricity consumers (Hunt, 2002). The small customers continue to be supplied by the 
distribution companies. According to Hunt (2002), this difference in structure encourages 
improvement in market efficiency through increased number of buyers. It is important that the 
access to the transmission network is non-discriminatory to avoid ‘higher than competitive 
prices and other abuses’ (Lambert, 2001:5). The transmission network owner should still not 
own generation plants. 
Retail competition 
Also known as retail-access or customer-access, this structure allows the customers to have a 
choice of their supplier of electricity, leading to even more competition (Hunt, 2002). There is 
more demand for competitive pricing of electricity from a wider array of consumers who have 
direct access to power generators. Craig and Savage (2013) define this as retail choice where 
consumers have a choice of who should supply them with electricity. The trading arrangements 
for meter reading and bill settlements are more sophisticated for this structure (Hunt, 2002). 
With the development of the market, the power market model tends to evolve from vertically 
integrated structure to retail competition through reforms that are supported by legislation. 
Murray (1998) explains that developing countries may need more government control in the 
ESI, as investments would normally need government guarantees. The ESI model then tends 
to be more integrated. The most liberal model of retail competition is more prevalent in 
developed countries like United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia (Hunt 
2002). 
2.3.2  The origins of ESI reforms 
Market based power sector reforms were first initiated in England, Wales, Norway and Chile 
in the 1980s. These countries had already attained excess power capacity and were grappling 
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with economic inefficiency and increasing calls for tariff reduction (Jamasb, Nepal and 
Timilsina, 2015). The strategy was to introduce competition in the generation of electricity and 
attain private sector-type efficiency in the power sector. Reforms in these countries entailed 
‘deregulation’. This meant that prices would be set by markets rather than regulators, the 
expected outcome of which was lower, competitive prices (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008).  
The reform models which were initially designed could not deliver desired results from the 
word go. Adjustments, and in some cases complete redesigns, were done to ensure attainment 
of objectives as originally envisaged (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008).  
However, with inadequate power capacity in the developing world, as well as poor financial 
management and technical skills, the challenges were different. Reforms in the third world 
were mainly driven by the need to improve the financial and technical performance of utilities, 
increasing electricity access and attracting investment (Jamasb et al, 2015). The World Bank 
(2006) estimated technical losses in the third world to be around 20%, compared to 9% in the 
developed world. The poor performance was the result of years of non-cost-reflective tariffs, 
which made recapitalization and network expansion difficult. Developing country ESI reforms 
were meant to address the shortage of capital to further develop the sector (Byrne and Mun, 
2003). According to Williams and Ghanadan (2006:821), ‘success depended largely on 
attracting capital from outside the country, of which governments only had limited control’.  
Therefore, one of the success factors of reforms in these countries would be an increase in 
tariffs (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008), which would then attract investment through assurance 
of a reasonable return. However, this tariff increase had the risk of reducing the growth of 
electricity access, especially for the rural poor, as private capital pursues high-end market in 
urban areas (Byrne and Mun, 2003). This is opposed to the reduction of tariffs, which was 
sought by the early reforms of the developed world (Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008)  
The table below summarizes the drivers of electricity sector reforms, including the external 
factors which assisted in influencing the outcomes. 
 
 
Table 2.1 Drivers of electricity sector reforms 
Electricity sector drivers External driver 
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Developed countries 
Excess capacity, use of costly generation 
technologies, economic inefficiency, 
growing consumer demands for cheap 
energy. 
 
Developing countries 
Lack of public sector financial resources to 
meet growing demand, institutional 
inefficiency, burden of energy subsidies, low 
service quality, high energy losses, poor 
service coverage, capacity shortage and 
energy sector investment constraints. 
a) Political and economic ideology: 
faith on the forces of market, 
competition and privatization. 
b) Technological innovation: such as 
the development of CCGTs 
c) Macroeconomic events: such as the 
post-Soviet economic transition 
(1989), Latin American debt crisis 
(1980s), Asian financial crises (1997-
1998) 
d) Capital raising options: privatization 
of state owned assets 
e) OECD energy deregulation: creation 
of new energy multinationals looking 
for new investment opportunities. 
f) Lending policies of donors: such as 
those of the World Bank and IMF 
with strings attached. 
g) National economic reform context: as 
a result of economic crisis and 
structural adjustment programs 
Source: Jamasb, Nepal and Timilsina (2015) 
There are different views on how the reform process should be sequenced. The literature of 
reforms suggests that the process should sequentially start with the establishment of a sound 
regulatory framework, then unbundle public sector utility, followed by organizing of the 
markets and lastly privatizing. However, Millan (2005) proposes that privatization should start 
with the distribution segment, and further argues that the textbook prescription of the reform 
process is good for creating a market-driven sector, which is attractive to private investors. 
Only Chile is known to have managed to follow the textbook sequence, and is an example of 
things going right in the reform process (Millan, 2005). However, Chile may have been helped 
by the autocratic rule of the 1980s to push a determined reform agenda without question from 
stakeholders (Millan, 2005). 
2.3.3  The standard ESI reform process 
The broad steps of the ‘standard model’ of reform are outlined by Gratwick and Eberhard 
(2008) as follows: corporatization, commercialization, regulation, restructuring and 
privatization. Corporatization involves transformation of the public utility into a private limited 
company, registered under the same legislation which registers private companies. This would 
pave the way for the corporate to have a separate governance system from parent ministry, as 
well as manage its own budget. This step takes the sector away from direct management by 
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government, thereby reducing the impact of political interference on operations of the sector. 
Commercialization would address the need for cost recovery and efficiency in operations, 
including metering, billing and revenue collection cycles (Eberhard et al, 2016). This improves 
the viability of the sector, giving assurance to industry players that they will be able to get a 
return on their investment if their cost structure is efficient. Privatization would start with 
allowing private players to participate in the sector through IPPs, with an independent regulator 
ensuring fairness in the industry and protection of electricity consumers.  
The reforms, which initially were haphazard, slowly converged into a ‘standard model’ 
(Gratwick and Eberhard, 2008). World Bank (1993) acknowledged that country specific 
situations would require that variations to the standard model be considered for changing 
circumstances of the specific country. In 2003, The World Bank’s position was that there is no 
standard model for ESI reforms but a coterie of options in varying sequential orders, depending 
on the country’s development strategy and environment (World Bank, 2003). Besant-Jones 
(2006) has similar views with the World Bank (2003) when he says that the conditions 
prevailing at the beginning of reforms determine the design of reforms. Those large to medium 
income economies can achieve remarkable results with ambitious reforms, but the same 
ambitious reforms may prove disastrous for low income countries (Besant-Johns, 2006). 
The table below summarizes the impact of starting conditions on success of reforms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 Types of power market reforms with different starting conditions. 
 Small low-income countries Large middle-income countries 
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Country starting conditions   
Power system size 
Access to electricity 
Investment climate 
Institutional capacity 
Government rating 
Very small 
Low 
Too poor to rate 
Very weak 
Poor 
Small to large 
High 
Low to medium 
Low to good 
Poor to good 
Initial reform characteristics   
Market structure Limited vertical unbundling. 
Single buyer with some simple 
bilateral trading for wholesale 
power 
Substantial vertical and horizontal 
unbundling. Bilateral trading or a 
central exchange for wholesale 
power 
Regulation Semi-autonomous regulatory 
agency mainly responsible for 
oversight of concessions. 
Autonomous regulatory agency 
with power to issue licences and 
approve retail tariffs and trading 
arrangements. 
Role of private sector Mainly independent power 
producers (IPPs); concessions in 
distribution under public-private 
partnerships 
Privatized generators and IPPs. 
Privately owned and financed 
distributors under long-term 
licenses 
Role of public sector Continued ownership of most 
power supply facilities. Primary 
responsibility for financing sector 
development. 
State owned in sensitive generation 
sectors (hydro, nuclear), 
transmission and non-viable 
distribution service areas. 
Role of competition Limited to bidding for long term 
agreements by IPPs and by private 
operation for distribution 
concessions. 
Competitive bidding for wholesale 
power contracts under bilateral 
trading or bidding into a power 
exchange. 
Source: Besant-Jones, J.E. (2006) 
It can then be deduced that proper analysis of where the country is in terms of the tabulated 
factors has a bearing on the success of the reform prescription. 
2.4 Factors affecting investment in the power sector 
Investment decisions are affected by many factors. Gratwick and Eberhard (2008) single out 
clear policy framework, regulatory oversight and power sector planning linkage to procurement 
process as important determinants of attractiveness of power sector to investment. The World 
Bank (2003) opines that the private sector's successful investing in ESI depends on the host 
country's political will and commitment to advancing the sector's reforms. IPPs have been 
applauded for quick to market projects which have resolved supply bottlenecks, as well as 
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augmenting public sector investing capacity (World Bank, 2003). Eberhard, Gratwick, Morela 
and Antmann (2016) also emphasize that the price and reliability of power produced by IPPs 
are relevant outcomes of a reform process. Any reform of the ESI is thus expected to have an 
impact on tariff and reliability of electricity supply, which should be used to evaluate whether 
the reform has been successful or not. 
Rao (2003) observed that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is subject to global equilibrium of 
demand and supply of investment capital as a country may have good investment policies but 
may still lag behind in receiving investment because of relative attractiveness of competing 
countries. He also argues that existing infrastructure and credibility of institutions to implement 
contracts have a role to play in attracting FDI. Imperfect credit markets, that typically 
characterize developing countries, lead to higher transaction costs and further tilt the 
equilibrium of capital flow against developing countries (Rao, 2003).  
Eberhard et al. (2016) summarize the factors which affect investment in the power sector in 
Sub-Saharan Africa as tabulated below. 
Table 2.3 Factors Contributing to Successful Independent Power Project Investments, 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Factor Details 
Country Level  
Stable country context 
 
-Stable macroeconomic policies. 
-Legal system allows contracts to be enforced, laws to be upheld, and 
arbitration. 
-Good repayment record and investment-grade rating. 
-Previous experience with private investment. 
Clear policy framework 
 
-Framework enshrined in legislation. 
-Framework that clearly specifies market structure and roles and terms for 
private and public-sector investments (generally for a single-buyer model, 
since wholesale competition is not yet seen in the African context). 
-Reform-minded “champions” to lead and implement framework with a 
long-term view. 
Transparent, consistent, and fair 
regulation 
-Transparent and predictable licensing and tariff framework. 
-Cost-reflective tariffs. 
-Competitive procurement of new generation capacity required by 
regulator. 
Coherent power sector planning -Power planning roles and functions clarified and allocated. 
-Planning function skilled, resourced, and empowered. 
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-Fair allocation of new build opportunities between utility and IPPs. 
-Built-in contingencies to avoid emergency power plants or blackouts. 
Competitive bidding practices 
 
-Planning linked to timely initiation of competitive tenders/auctions. 
-Competitive procurement process adequately resourced and fair and 
transparent. 
Project level  
Favorable equity partners -Local capital/partner contribution where possible. 
-Risk appetite for project. 
-Experience with developing country project risk. 
-Involvement of a DFI partner (and/or host country government). 
-Reasonable, fair ROE. 
-Development-minded firms. 
Favorable debt arrangements 
 
-Competitive financing. 
-Local capital/markets that mitigate foreign exchange risk. 
-Risk premium demanded by financiers, or capped by off-taker, matches 
country/project risk. 
-Some flexibility in terms and conditions (possible refinancing). 
Creditworthy off-taker -Adequate managerial capacity. 
-Efficient operational practices. 
-Low technical losses. 
-Commercially sound metering, billing, and collections. 
-Sound customer service. 
Secure and adequate revenue 
stream 
 
-Robust PPA (stipulates capacity and payment as well as dispatch, fuel 
metering, interconnection, insurance, force majeure, transfer, termination, 
change-of-law provisions, refinancing arrangements, dispute resolution, 
and so on). 
-Security arrangements where necessary (escrow accounts, letters of 
credit, standby debt facilities, hedging and other derivative instruments, 
committed public budget and/or taxes/levies, targeted subsidies and 
output-based aid, hard currency contracts, indexation in contracts). 
Credit enhancements and other 
risk management and 
mitigation measures 
 
-Sovereign guarantees. 
-Political risk insurance (PRI). 
-Partial risk guarantees (PRGs). 
-International arbitration. 
Positive technical performance 
 
-Efficient technical performance high (including availability). 
-Sponsors who anticipate potential conflicts (especially related to O&M 
and budgeting) and mitigate them. 
Strategic management and 
relationship building 
-Sponsors who work to create a good image in the country through 
political relationships, development funds, effective communications, and 
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 strategic management of their contracts, particularly in the face of 
exogenous shocks and other stresses. 
Source: Eberhard, A., Gratwick, K.,Morella, E., and Antmann, P. (2016) 
 
ESI reforms have been associated with improvement in the attractiveness of the industry to 
private capital (Jamasb et al, 2015). However, Eberhard et al. (2016) argue that there is no 
correlation between reforms and investment in IPPs, despite the fact that literature proposes 
this to be a necessary condition (Jamasb et al, 2015). 
2.5  The Zimbabwe ESI market and regulatory structure since 2002  
In 2002, the Electricity Act [Chapter 13:19] of Zimbabwe provided for the establishment of 
the Zimbabwe Electricity Regulatory Commission (ZERC), as well as the generation, 
transmission and distribution companies which would fall under a company that would hold 
shares on behalf of government (Zimbabwe, 2002). Any other companies could be established 
in the electricity supply industry at the discretion of the minister and fall under the same holding 
company (Zimbabwe, 2002). The Electricity Act was implemented in 2003, resulting in the 
formation of six companies, namely: 
(i) Zimbabwe Power Company (Pvt) Ltd (ZPC) responsible for power generation. 
(ii) Zimbabwe Electricity Transmission Company (Pvt) Ltd (ZETCO) responsible for 
electricity transmission. 
(iii) Zimbabwe Electricity Distribution Company (Pvt) Ltd (ZEDC) responsible for 
electricity distribution. 
(iv) Zesa Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd responsible for transformer manufacturing and other 
non-core activities 
(v) Powertel Communications (Pvt) Ltd responsible for Information Communication 
Technologies for the group. 
(vi) Zesa Holdings (Pvt) Ltd responsible for holding government shares in the five 
companies. 
ZETCO and ZEDC were later amalgamated in 2010 (ZETDC, 2010) following the 
promulgation of Electricity Amendment Act of 2007 (Zimbabwe, 2007). This was in an effort 
to reduce staff costs at executive level, as the benefit of the reform was getting elusive. The 
argument was that these were similar businesses in the value chain and that there was no need 
for separate companies. This is, however, against Milan (2005), who suggests that distribution 
should actually be privatized first to create confidence in the investment markets. According 
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to Milan (2005), it means distribution should remain separate in readiness for privatization 
either through sale of equity in the public entity or introduction of private competitors. 
In 2011, the government, in an effort to reduce cost on regulatory bodies in the energy sector, 
realized that there was need to regulate electricity and petroleum under the same regulator. The 
Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority (ZERA) Act was promulgated as a result (Zimbabwe, 
2011). It took over the regulatory functions of electricity and petroleum. This, however, has 
implications on diluting the focus that is required to regulate the ESI.  
The primary instruments for regulation of the ESI are the Electricity Act: Chapter 13:19 and 
the Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority Act: Chapter 13:23. These legislations mandate 
the regulator to develop guidelines and codes that should be used to guide licensees in their 
operations. The Electricity Licensing Guidelines and Regulations were developed as a result. 
The tariff code was also developed to illustrate the tariff application parameters for licensees. 
The Transmission Code and Distribution Code give operational guidelines and reporting 
requirements for Transmission licensees and Distribution licensees. 
The regulation instruments are meant to ensure credibility, transparency and independence of 
the regulator. An independent regulator is critical in balancing the needs of all stakeholders in 
the licensing, conflict resolution and tariff awards (AfDB, 2015). Zimbabwe (2011) 
emphasizes that ‘Subject to this Act, the Authority shall not, in the lawful exercise of its 
functions under this Act, be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority.’ This 
clause in the ZERA Act assures licensees of the independence of the regulator, and therefore 
is meant to improve investment attractiveness. The instruments are not only important in the 
regulatory function that they play, they also give credence to the attractiveness of the sector to 
investment. 
The government's realization that 'private sector will be the engine of economic growth and 
recovery in Zimbabwe' led to the necessity of 'promoting competition, efficiency and 
investment in the energy sector' (Ministry of Energy and Power Development (MoEPD), 
2012). This was attempted through the National Energy Policy of 2012, which was approved 
as a program to improve the efficiency of the ESI and attract private capital through IPPs and 
tariffs that are cost-reflective and transparent (MoEPD, 2012). 
Xxx paragraph saying – I now turn to describe offtake arrangements, power sector planning 
etc. which have a bearing on sector performance and its attractiveness to investors (or 
something like it). 
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2.5.1  Off-taker arrangements 
The regulator authorizes the primary transmission licensee to purchase power for bulk resale 
to other licensees while licensing the generation licensee to sell power ‘to any transmission, 
distribution or supply licensee who purchases electricity for resale and, with the approval of 
the Commission, to any one or more consumers’ (Zimbabwe, 2002). This means that power 
producers can sell directly to distribution licensees or even consumers by paying for the use of 
the transmission system. This is in line with AfDB (2015), which explains that the off-taker 
flexibility is necessary for the power producers to have a way to sell the power they produce 
should the PPA be terminated for any reason.  
The Government of Zimbabwe (2002) also requires the primary transmission licensee to 
"purchase power in an open, transparent and competitive manner". This suggests the need for 
competitive tendering for IPPs based on tariff, technology and other factors. However, this 
process has not been done yet in the procurement of electricity supply. Power deficit has been 
worsening over the years, with load shedding increasing in 2010 ‘by 142% to 2,659.783GWh 
up from 1,097.244GWh shed in 2009’ (ZETDC, 2010:13). This was in the background of 
introduction of a multi-currency regime in 2009, which led to the stabilization of prices, ending 
the drawn-out period of hyper-inflation (ZETDC (2009:7). This indication of deterioration in 
the load shedding indicates the availability of a ready market for electricity, which would have 
been a factor to attract investment, especially when there is a strong currency as a revenue 
currency. There are other factors, however, about the off-taker that may affect investment 
attractiveness. The debtors’ book grew from USD 4,611,360 (Four million six hundred and 
eleven thousand three hundred and sixty united states dollars) (ZETDC, 2009) in 2009 to USD 
1,069,246,607 (One billion and sixty million two hundred and forty-six thousand six hundred 
and seven United States dollars) (ZETDC, 2015) in 2015. This is an indication of poor revenue 
collection by the off-taker.  This presents a risk that the off-takers may not be able to pay for 
energy supplied by the power producer if they are not able to collect revenue. Other 
securitization arrangements like escrow accounts and letters of credit are then required to 
improve the creditworthiness of the off-taker. 
 
2.5.2  Power sector planning 
ZETDC is mandated to undertake least cost system development planning for the expansion of 
the national generation and grid capacity to meet electricity demand growth (ZETDC, 2010; 
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Zimbabwe, 2002). This process involves proper demand forecasting, which allows matching 
with prospective power producer for demand and supply balancing. Competitive procurement 
is then the best way of ensuring best pricing for power production, by way of exposing power 
producers to bidding. The planning process should also allow for the lead time inherent in the 
procurement process, so that demand and supply are properly matched over time (AfDB, 2015). 
ZETDC has a 20-year system development plan which is developed through forecasting the 
demand by consolidating future electricity requirements for different customer categories. This 
forecasted demand is used to schedule prospective power projects on a least cost priority basis. 
However, AfDB (2015) also emphasizes that this bidding process is not effective under 
circumstances of power shortage, which invariably necessitates government to expedite the 
procurement process by going for unsolicited bids. In this case, the projects are implemented 
based on the ability for the developer to reach financial close and implementing the project 
without regard of the competitiveness of the cost. 
2.5.3 Licensing framework 
The Government of Zimbabwe (2011) mandates ZERA to license all players in the Zimbabwe 
ESI with capacity of more than 100kVA. The generation licensee “may supply electricity to 
any transmission, distribution and retail/supply licensee who purchases electricity for resale” 
(ZERA, 2012). The prospective generation licensees should meet a number of requirements 
before being issued with a license. These include power purchase agreement (PPA), 
interconnection agreement, land use permit, environmental and social impact assessment, 
among others (ZERA, 2012). 
The PPA is an agreement between the power producer and the off-taker. It defines obligations 
of the parties and also serves as an assurance for the regulator that there is a market for the 
power to be produced by the IPP. The PPA would also indicate the load factor (how many 
hours per day the power station will be producing power), and this will assist in the assessment 
of the tariff requirement that would adequately meet fixed and variable costs and give a fair 
return to the investor. Power projects are naturally long lifetime investments (Eberhard et al, 
2016). Investors would also want long term PPAs that would guarantee the market for the 
power produced for the life of the project.  
The interconnection agreement is the outcome of grid impact studies, which is an assessment 
of the effect of connecting the IPP to the grid. The incoming project should not derogate the 
grid such that it will adversely affect other users already connected to the grid. If there is any 
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derogation, then the investors in the IPP should also fund projects meant to mitigate the impact 
of their connection. 
The licensee should prove ownership of the land on which the project is going to be developed. 
Clear ownership rights give comfort to financiers in ensuring certainty in the ability 'to exercise 
step-in rights and take over the company and its assets in the event of loan defaults' (AfDB, 
2015). This then aids to attractiveness of the project to finance. 
All licensees are to comply with conditions of the license. However, in practice the IPP gets a 
letter of support from the off-taker as an indication that there is scope in the market for the IPP 
to be able to supply. The IPP is given an interim license which they use to fulfil all the other 
conditions like apply for grid impact studies, secure land, etc. The PPA will be negotiated 
during the course of fulfilling other conditions and is approved by the regulator as the last 
condition before construction can start.  
2.5.4 Regulatory Codes 
The National Energy Policy was approved by government in 2012 with an objective to set the 
framework which would support implementation of the new ESI structure (ZERA, 2013b). The 
framework has three broad categories of supporting the structure, namely Acts of Parliament, 
government policy and instruments issued by ZERA (ZERA, 2013b). Amongst the instruments 
issued by ZERA are the grid code, the distribution code and the tariff code. 
Grid code 
ZERA developed the Grid Code with the objective of setting a framework of accountabilities 
for the ESI players to have open access to the transmission grid (ZERA, 2013b). These are 
achieved through the setting up of minimum technical standards for those wanting to connect 
to the national transmission system, as well as those providing the service. The System 
Operator’s obligations as well as those of other players are properly defined so as to maintain 
efficiency and safety in the operation of the national transmission system (ZERA, 2013b). 
ZERA supervises the adherence of all licensees through regular reports on performance, as 
well as accidents that may happen on the network from time to time. A schedule of penalties 
is also provided to guide those that would have failed to meet requirements, to encourage them 
to perform (ZERA, 2013b). The details of the code are delivered in the form of other sub codes: 
governance code, grid connection code, performance standards code, network planning code, 
scheduling and dispatch code, system operation code, metering code, transmission tariff code 
and information exchange code (ZERA, 2013b). 
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Distribution code 
The distribution code was developed by the regulator in consultation with all stakeholders for 
the primary purpose to ‘ensure efficient coordinated development, operation and maintenance 
of the electricity Distribution System’ (ZERA, 2013c). This is achieved through the setting of 
minimum standards for operations, technical requirements and safety and customer handling 
procedures. Any deviation from the minimum requirements is subject to penalty after 
investigation by the regulator (ZERA, 2013c). 
Tariff Code 
The tariff code details the methodology used to arrive at the tariff, which is used in the industry 
by power producers and retailers. It was designed to meet one of the basic functions of ZERA 
which Zimbabwe (2011) says is 'to ensure that the prices charged by licensees are fair to 
consumers in light of the need for fair prices to be sufficient to allow licensees to finance their 
activities and obtain reasonable earnings for their efficient operation'. It means consumers have 
to meet the full cost of the electricity they receive (ZERA, 2011). The tariff methodology 
therefore guides that the revenue to be earned by a licensee should be the sum of the costs of 
supplying electricity, a reasonable return and any other expenses as may be allowed by the 
regulator (ZERA, 2011). The United States of America’s Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC), which oversees interstate electricity trade and the Public Utilities 
Commission (PUC), which is responsible for intrastate electricity regulation, both have the 
same tariff structure which considers production cost plus a fair return (Craig and Savage, 
2013). The costs as claimed by the licensee should be incurred in a transparent manner which 
should involve competitive bidding for procurement of any services (ZERA, 2011). Technical 
and non-technical loss reduction becomes key to ensure efficiency in the cost build-up of the 
tariff (AfDB, 2015). 
AfDB (2015) also stresses that while cost reflective tariff is important to ensure financial 
viability of both the power producer and the off-taker, financial solvency has also got to be 
enhanced through robust metering, billing and revenue collection strategies to ensure 
sustainability of the ESI.  
ZERA uses a Revenue Requirement methodology to set the tariff as detailed in 
figure 2.2 below. 
Figure 2.2: Revenue Requirement methodology 
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Source: ZERA (2013) 
It is very clear that the revenue requirement methodology, if implemented to the letter, would 
not fail to deliver a cost reflective tariff. However, political considerations have always led to 
turn down of properly justified applications for tariff increase. Some customer categories 
have always complained that the tariff is too high citing tariff in other regional countries. 
Tariffs are driven by the generation technologies and the respective production cost of each 
technology. This means that requests for tariff review should be looked at with the generation 
mix of Zimbabwe in mind and the respective cost of generation.   
2.5.5  Investment in the generation sector 
The private sector has only been issued with generation licenses. Government of Zimbabwe 
(2002) provides or three categories of licenses, namely; 
(i) Generation license 
(ii) Transmission and bulk supply license 
(iii) Distribution and retail license 
In excess of twenty IPPs have been licensed since 2002. Only a few of these with small capacity 
- not exceeding 20MW - have been commissioned (ZERA, 2014), but the big ones that would 
have changed the power supply landscape are struggling to get fully developed. This implies 
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that the growth in the supply of electricity is lagging behind the projections of the regulator. 
The reasons for this development are the subject of this study. 
ZERA (2014) categorizes the issued licensees according to the stage of project development 
into five, namely: (i) Concept/Prefeasibility stage 
   (ii) Feasibility/Proof of bankability 
   (iii) Funding 
   (iv) Construction 
   (v) Operational 
Investors initially came up with proposals for large projects with the hope of resolving power 
deficit problem once and for all. However, the securing of funding increasingly became elusive. 
Smaller projects started getting funding and were being commissioned. This led to an increase 
in the number of small IPP projects which got commissioned. These are then summarized as 
tabulated below; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4 Licensed generation projects as at 31 December 2014 
Stage of development Licensed projects Total Capacity 
(MW) 
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Stage 1 – Concept/Pre-feasibility 
stage 
(Completion of all activities to define 
project for full feasibility) 
i. Sengwa Power station 
ii. Essar Hwange Power Plant 
iii. Essar Captive Power (Kwekwe) 
iv. Geobase Gwanda Solar 
v. Great Zimbabwe Hydro 
vi. Manako Power 
2,117.5 
 
Stage 2 – Feasibility/Proof of 
bankability 
(Completion of all activities to prove 
project bankability including EPC 
contract and PPA approval) 
i. Lusulu 
ii. Southern Energy 
iii. Gairezi 
iv. Kupinga Renewable Energy 
2,661.6 
Stage 3 – Funding 
(Completion of all activities leading 
to financial close and fulfilment of 
conditions president) 
i. China Africa Sunlight Energy 
Gwayi Power Station 
ii. Hwange Expansion Project 
1,200 
Stage 4 – Construction 
(Completion of all activities to project 
commissioning) 
i. Kariba Extension Project 
ii. Pungwe B 
315.25 
Stage 5 – Operational 
(Commercial Operation) 
i. Border Timbers 
ii. Duru 
iii. Nyamingura 
iv. Pungwe A 
v. Hippo Valley Estates 
vi. Triangle Estates 
vii. Green Fuel 
101.75 
 State owned power stations 
i. Kariba Hydro Power Station 
ii. Hwange Thermal Power Station 
iii. Munyati Thermal Power Station 
iv. Harare Thermal Power Station 
v. Bulawayo Thermal Power 
Station 
1,936 
Total Capacity  8,332.1 
Source: ZERA 2014 Annual Report 
There was later a realization that it is difficult for large capital-intensive projects to be 
developed by public sector or private sector operating independently. In 2015, the Joint 
Venture Act [Chapter 22:22] was promulgated (Zimbabwe, 2015) to guide project 
development, with the public sector partnering the private sector. The effect of this regulation 
is yet to be felt. 
2.6 Principal - Agent problem in the Zimbabwe ESI 
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The principal agent theory explains the lack of alignment between the interests of the principal 
and those of the agent where the principal risks incurring losses in the process (Schnader, 
Bedard and Cannon, 2015). The agents will have private information which they use to make 
private decisions, which decisions may be detrimental to the principal. The agent is therefore 
not motivated to discharge his duties to the best of his ability. The principal normally has to 
give incentives to motivate the agent to deliver their duties diligently. 
The players in the Zimbabwe ESI are the government, ZERA, ZETDC, ZPC, IPPs and 
customers. These players have different interests and the relationships can be explained by the 
principal-agent theory. Each one has interests that may not be consistent with the interests of 
others, and this impedes proper implementation of legislations. 
The government has an obligation to protect the customer from being overcharged by power 
producers who are IPPs and ZPC. Prior to the reforms of 2002, the government (the principal) 
was the approving authority of ZESA (the agent) tariff applications. At the same time ZESA 
was the licensing authority for any power producer above 100kVA. In an effort to protect the 
consumer, government would delay approval of ZESA consumer tariff and in some cases not 
approve at all. ZESA, being the regulator for IPPs would not grant high tariff to IPPs as this 
would be detrimental to their cost structure. IPPs also would see the off-taker’s role of 
regulating the market as a risk and would then hold back investment. This principal-agent 
problem between the government and ZESA lead to the need to institute reforms to deregulate 
the market culminating in reforms of 2002. 
Through the reforms of 2002, ZERA was appointed to regulate the industry using the ZERA 
Act and instruments like the tariff code and licensing of industry players. It was envisaged that 
an independent regulator would review and approve both the consumer and producer tariff. 
With the cost-plus tariff methodology, power producers want to load as much of costs into the 
tariff formula to increase their profit. This is done through efforts to justify cost on the basis of 
country risk perception, cost of capital, etc. ZERA is mandated to analyze and benchmark  the 
costs when reviewing the tariff applications by all licensees for approval, to ensure that the 
costs are efficiently incurred (Zimbabwe, 2002). In this particular case, the government is the 
principal through ZERA. IPPs, as the agents, have the interests of making money ahead of 
providing adequate electricity. ZERA has to design the correct incentives in order to motivate 
IPPs to develop their projects. 
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The government is also the principal in its relationship with ZPC and ZETDC. ZERA is again 
representing government in regulating the operations of licensees in their discharge of service. 
In this case ZETDC is mandated to deliver electricity and get paid for the service provided. 
ZETDC applies for a cost reflective tariff which will ensure continuous provision of quality 
service. The government in turn protects some consumers from being disconnected even if they 
don’t pay for the service. Tariff increase applications are also turned down so as to protect the 
consumers from high costs, but it is against the requirements of the investors who would want 
to be assured that the service they give after investing will be paid for at the right price. 
This principal-agent problem breeds a situation where reforms are properly crafted but 
investments do not materialize, because the parties in the industry do not practice what is in 
the reform agenda.  
Asymmetric Information has also had a role in the outcome of ESI reforms. Rao (2003) define 
asymmetric information as ‘lack of equivalence of information contents between parties to a 
common issue that affects each other’s interests’. This can also be occasioned by ‘unequal 
capacities among the parties to a common issue to process a given set of information’, (Rao, 
2003). It has been argued that the cost of electricity has a direct bearing on the cost of products 
on the market and this has a direct impact on export competitiveness and therefore economic 
performance. Industrial and mining consumers have always lobbied the government of lower 
tariff for this reason and this has often been listened to by government. The result has been 
non-cost reflective tariff. The has always argued that the electricity utility should manage cost 
so as to avert the requirement to increase tariff. The intention by government has mainly been 
misunderstood by the electricity utility who accuse the government of working through the 
regulator to block tariff increases. This has compromised the perception of independence of 
the regulator. 
While the government realizes the need for private sector participation in the ESI, it has not 
been doing the right things to attract investments i.e. move towards cost reflective tariff and 
give the regulator unfettered independence. The principal-agent problem and the asymmetrical 
information clearly apply as definition of the non-response of investors to fund licensed IPP 
projects. 
 
CHAPTER 3 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research Design & Methodology 
The research seeks to establish the impact of the reforms of 2002 on investment in the 
generation sector of the ESI in Zimbabwe. The impact will be measured by the number of 
licenses issued after the reforms, and investments embarked on after the reforms, as well as the 
improvement in the amount of power supply out of those investments. The purpose of this 
chapter is to describe how the study was carried out. 
3.2 Research design 
Creswell (2003) alludes to three possible research approaches; qualitative, quantitative and 
mixed methods. Qualitative approach is largely open-ended and the results thereof are difficult 
to generalize while quantitative approach is close-ended with highly generalizable results. 
Mixed methods approach is a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches. Its main 
advantage is its ability to strike a balance in generalizability between the qualitative and 
quantitative approaches (Creswell, 2003).  
Within the mixed methods approach, Creswell (2003) further clarifies that there are three 
designs that can be used for data collection; convergent parallel, explanatory sequential and 
exploratory sequential. Convergent parallel is where the quantitative and qualitative data are 
collected simultaneously and integrated for analysis. In explanatory sequential and exploratory 
sequential, either quantitative or qualitative data is collected and analyzed first and the other 
data collected to build on the findings of the earlier method (Creswell, 2003). The convergent 
parallel design was chosen for this study. 
Survey research methodology was used to collect qualitative and quantitative primary data, 
which were then used to answer the questions. Stratified sampling was done by considering the 
ZERA (2014) tabulated progress report on IPP development as the sampling frame and then 
picking the first two IPPs from each category. A questionnaire was administered among ten 
power producers according to the categories of project development, as illustrated by ZERA 
(2014). Two representatives from two power producers in the same category were chosen. The 
two power producers and two respondents were meant to balance the views of respondents in 
the same category and in the same power producer. The respondents were in the project 
development and finance departments of the power producer, as they were the ones closest to 
the dynamics of the reform and investment.  
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The power producers sampled are as tabulated below: 
Table 3.1: Sample of respondents 
Category Number Power Producer Proprietor 
Concept/Prefeasibility 
Study 
1 Sengwa RioZim 
2 Essar Essar Holdings 
Feasibility/Proof of 
bankability 
3 PER Lusulu Pan African Energy 
Resources (Pvt) Ltd 
4 Southern Energy Southern Energy 
Funding 5 China Africa Sunlight 
Energy Company 
(CASECO) 
CASECO 
6 Hwange 7&8 Zimbabwe Power 
Company 
Construction 7 Kariba 7&8 Zimbabwe Power 
Company 
8 Pungwe B Nyangani Renewable 
Energy (NRE) 
Operational 9 Border Timbers Border Timbers 
10 Duru Nyangani Renewable 
Energy 
According to the sampling procedure, two proprietors own power projects in two different 
categories. It would follow that there would be duplication of administration of questionnaires 
and interviews on the same respondents. The respondents were then reduced from ten power 
producers to eight.  
Structured interviews were also conducted with one employee from each of the IPPs sampled 
for questionnaire administration. This was done to balance the views elicited from the 
questionnaire with those from the interviews. One employee was also interviewed from each 
of the following banks; Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe (IDBZ), Africa 
Development Bank (AfDB), World Bank and Stanbic Bank Zimbabwe. Interviews allow for 
clarification of questions and have a higher response rate (Sherblom, Sullivan and Sherblom, 
1993). The banks were chosen on the basis of their clear mandate on infrastructure investment 
in Zimbabwe and their active role in pursuing this mandate. Senior people in the infrastructure 
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divisions of the banks were targeted. These were representing the views of financiers of the 
investment in ESI. Interviews were conducted with one executive employee from ZERA, the 
regulator and one executive employee from ZETDC, the off-taker and one executive employee 
from the Ministry of Energy and Power Development (MoEPD) to gather their respective 
views. 
The introductory section of the questionnaire and the interview questions, which introduced 
the researcher, the purpose of the study and assured their anonymity, helped to improve the 
response rate (Plump and Spyridakis, 1992).  
Wimmer and Dominick (1991) assert that response rate reduces drastically when the 
questionnaire takes longer than 20 minutes to complete, and that respondent fatigue for 
interview survey begins to affect responses when an interview lasts longer than an hour. The 
questionnaire was designed to be brief and to the point so that it would not take time for the 
respondent to answer the questions. Interview questions were also brief and straightforward, to 
avoid the need for clarifications. Pilot testing, as explained below, also helped in identifying 
areas which needed simplification and review, and the necessary changes were made. 
3.3 Sampling and sample size 
Sampling is the creation of a subset of a population under study when the study cannot be 
carried out on the entire population. The study is then carried out on the sample and the results 
generalized on the population. Certainty is therefore abandoned in favour of generalization 
through the inference process (Bless and Higson-Smith, 1995:86)  
The population for the study consists of all licensees of ZERA, as well as the local and foreign 
banking institutions operating in Zimbabwe. The regulator, the off-taker and the Ministry of 
Energy and Power Development are also part of the population. 
The table below summarizes the sample and the sample size. 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Sample size of respondents 
Item Respondent No. for 
questionnaire 
No. for interview Total 
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1 RioZim 2 1 3 
2 Essar Holdings 2 1 3 
3 PER Lusulu 2 1 3 
4 Southern Energy 2 1 3 
5 CASECo 2 1 3 
6 NRE 2 1 3 
7 Border Timbers 2 1 3 
8 ZPC 2 1 3 
9 IDBZ  1 1 
10 AfDB  1 1 
11 World Bank  1 1 
12 Stanbic  1 1 
13 ZERA  1 1 
14 ZETDC  1 1 
15 MoEPD  1 1 
16 Grand Total (Sample size) 16 15 31 
 
3.4 Pilot testing 
It is critical to have a data gathering instrument that can be effectively used to collect the 
required data. A pilot study helps to assess the relevance and clarity of questions leading to 
useful revision of the survey (Sherblom et al, 1993). 
A pilot test was done for both the interview questions and the questionnaire for purposes of 
clarifying the questions on all points that could be unclear to the respondents. This was done 
by administering the questionnaire and the interview questions to respondents from two 
organizations that would not participate in the study but were part of the population from which 
the sample was drawn. Recording of any points that needed clarification before embarking on 
a full-scale data collection was done, and the adjustments implemented. Pilot testing was also 
used to gauge the amount of time required to complete the questionnaire or the interview, so 
that the respondents could be advised correctly on how much time it would take to go through 
the questionnaire responses or the interview. 
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3.5 Data collection 
The questionnaire design used a five-point Likert scale to capture respondents’ views. Five-
point was chosen because it is viewed by most social research scientists as the most optimal 
(Van der Ejik & Rose, 2015). 
Options of administering the questionnaire through email, telephone or face-to-face depend on 
the time and financial budget of the research. The sampled respondents were telephoned to 
arrange for ethical clearance, form-signing, interviews and the questionnaires.  
The Managing Director of the sampled organizations were targeted for interviews. The 
interviews were all done at the offices of the respondents. Questionnaires delivered at the same 
time and Finance Directors were requested to be one of the respondents for questionnaires and 
any other senior employee of the Managing Director’s choice who was conversant with 
investments in IPPs. The respondents were not supposed to discuss the questionnaire so as to 
reduce the bias and internal invalidity that would result from two questionnaires given to one 
organization ending up reflecting the same view. One interview was targeted per day so as to 
allow for transcription of the gathered data on the same day while memory of the researcher is 
still fresh to improve on accuracy. The majority of questionnaire were collected on the same 
data as they were filled in while the interview was going on. The informed consent forms were 
also delivered to respondents and signed on the same day.  
3.6 Data analysis 
According to Sherblom et al (1993), “the most straightforward method of analysis is the 
descriptive reporting of the frequencies and percentage of responses in each response category 
of each question”. The data from questionnaires was tabulated and also presented on graphs. 
An analysis of the graphs was then done to extract the trends of the views of the respondents 
according to the thematic areas. The thematic areas were taken from literature and used to craft 
the question.  
The interview data was analyzed using NVivo qualitative data analysis guidelines in the 
following steps: 
1. Tabulating the questions in the same wording that they were asked. 
2. Summarize the responses using codes that capture the words carrying the main 
meaning of the response. 
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3. Reviewing the trend in the responses to the questions. The interview questions were 
crafted according to themes that were derived from literature such that the questions 
formed the themes of the interviews.  
4. Analysis of the themes across the tabulated codes to discern the impact of the reform 
to investment especially in generation. 
The NVivo software was not used as the volume of data is small and can be handled manually. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the research findings and an analysis of the same are presented in three sections. 
In the first, significant themes and perspectives which emerged through the interviews are 
discussed. This then provides a backdrop against which the questionnaire survey results are 
interrogated. In the following section, an analysis of these results is advanced, with reference 
to the theoretical literature. In the third and final section, an exploration of the outcomes of this 
study is undertaken with reference to the research questions and objectives outlined in Chapter 
1.  
4.2 Research Results 
4.2.1 Interviews 
Interviews were carried out on 6 IPPs, the publicly owned generation company ZPC, the off 
taker ZETDC, the regulator ZERA, banks Stanbic, IDBZ and AfDB and the parent ministry 
MoEPD. The interviews questions were crafted to address identified ESI reform themes and 
expected outcomes. The responses recorded during data gathering were coded for data analysis 
following the NVivo qualitative data analysis guidelines. The detailed responses are attached 
as appendix 1 and the coded responses are attached as appendix 3. 
These themes are: 
(i) Independence of the regulator, tariff negotiation and tariff methodology 
(ii) PPA negotiation process and securitization requirements. 
(iii) Financiers’ views on the reform 
The expected outcomes of the reform which are also tracked in the interviews are: 
(i) Whether there is improvement in capital investment and the MW output of the ESI 
both from IPPs and ZPC 
(ii) The impact of off-taker operations on investments by IPPs including revenue 
collection. 
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IPPs and ZPC generally view the regulator as independent while banks and ZETDC expressed 
reservations. It was surprising that amidst all other stakeholders giving the regulator some 
semblance of independence, the regulator feels they are not independent. MoEPD 
acknowledged that the regulator cannot be so independent as government will have to give 
policy direction so as to exercise their mandate of protecting the consumers. The tariff 
methodology was acceptable though the tariff negotiation takes longer than expected. 
 
PPA negotiation was found to be fair though it takes time. Escrow accounts and government 
guarantees were the main securitization instruments demanded by financiers. 
 
Financiers were not consistent in their view of the reforms. They however agreed that 
deepening the reforms would improve attractiveness of the ESI. The current form of the 
reforms was meant to be transitional while the economic environment improved. 
 
During the interview with the regulator, some data was offered to give detail to responses to 
some questions. The table below details the data. 
Table 4.1: Licenses issued by ZERA 
 LICENSEE TECHNOLOGY CAPACITY ESTIMATED 
COST  A. OPERATIONAL  MW  
1 Border Timbers* Biomass- wood 
waste 
0.5  
2 Duru mini-hydro 2.2 2,969,604 
3 Green Fuel Bagasse 18.3  
4 Nyamingura Mini-hydro 1.1 6,769,053 
5 Pungwe A Mini hydro 2.75 4,474,576 
6 Hippo Valley Estates bagasse (co-gen) 33  
7 Triangle Estates bagasse (co-gen) 45 36,814,167 
8 Pungwe B Power Station mini-hydro 15.25 26,588,488 
9 Pungwe C Power Station Pvt Ltd mini-hydro 3.72 7,000,000 
 SUB-TOTAL  121.82  
 B. NOT YET OPERATIONAL    
1 Sengwa Power Station (RioZim) Thermal (Coal- 
fired) 
2400 4,400,000,000 
2 PER Lusulu (Pan African Energy 
Resources (Pvt) Ltd) 
Thermal (Coal- 
fired) 
2000 4,000,000,000 
3 Southern Energy Thermal (Coal- 
fired) 
600 1,100,000,000 
4 China Africa Sunlight Energy Thermal (Coal- 
fired) 
600 2,323,000,000 
5 Great Zimbabwe Hydro Power (Pvt) Ltd Mini-hydro 5 6,700,000 
6 Zimbabwe Power Company Gairezi Mini-hydro 30 128,012,352 
7 Manako Power (Pvt) Ltd Mini-hydro 2.5 13,000,000 
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8 Kupinga Renewable Energy Mini-hydro 1.6 4,434,500 
9 Kariba Hydro Power (Pvt) Ltd Hydro 300 483,000,000 
1
0 
GeoBase Klean Energy Africa Solar 250 240,000,000 
1
1 
Hwange Power Station Stage III Thermal (Coal- 
fired) 
600 1,153,792,052 
2 
Yellow Africa Solar PV 50 109,950,000 
1
3 
H.T.Gen Mini-hydro 3.3 6,048,016 
1
4 
Plum Solar Solar PV 5 6,723,000 
1
5 
Immaculate Technologies mini hydro 1.7 2,962,000 
1
6 
Shilands Enterprises gas fired 345 405,604,134 
1
7 
De Green Rhino Energy solar PV 50 100,000,000 
1
8 
Lueven Investments Solar PV 10 20,000,000 
1
9 
Hauna Power Station Private Limited mini hydro 2.3 7,301,835 
2
0 
Sinogy Power Solar PV 175 489,760,000 
2
1 
Centragrid Private Limited Solar PV 25 50,334,049 
2
2 
Utopia Power Company Private Limited Solar PV 15 25,100,000 
3 
SolGas (Private) Limited Solar PV 5 8,423,750 
2
4 
Richaw Solar Tech Private Limited Solar PV 5 10,018,000 
 SUB TOTAL  7481.4  
 GRAND TOTAL  7603.22  
 C.CANCELLED LICENCES    
1 Essar Africa Holdings (Pvt) Ltd ** Thermal(Coal- 
fired) 
600  
2 Essar (Captive power)** Thermal(Coal- 
fired) 
60  
3 Rusitu Power Corporation*** mini hydro 0.75  
  TOTAL 660.75  
Number of licensed projects = 33 
Number of state owned licensed projects = 3 (highlighted in grey) 
Number of operational IPPs = 9 
Number of IPPs still to be developed = 21 
*Border Timbers not operating due to lack of spare parts 
**Essar’s licence was cancelled in 2015 
***Rusitu Power Plant has not been operating since 2008, and its license has been cancelled. 
Source: Provided by ZERA during interviews  
The estimated costs for Border Timbers, Green fuel and Hippo Valley could not be verified 
during the period of the study so these were not submitted. From the interviews, Border 
Timbers uses power for own consumption so would not need a tariff. This could be the reason 
the regulator was not worried about the development costs.  
Hippo Valley Estates is a sugar plantation company. The company owns Hippo Valley power 
station, which produces power only seasonally during the milling season. The power station 
has a power banking arrangement with the off-taker where they supply the off-taker during the 
sugar milling season when they generate and then withdraw the energy banked with the off-
taker during off-milling season. The off-taker charges 20% which is paid in energy. This means 
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that Hippo Valley does not have to prove investment costs to the regulator hence the figures 
were not provided. 
Green fuel is sugar cane producers like Hippo Valley. They have capacity to produce excess 
of their requirements. They would want to sell excess to the off-taker. Their costs have not 
been agreed with the regulator though they have been licensed and have commissioned their 
power station. 
Only 121.82 MW have been commissioned out of the 8000 MW licensed. The commissioned 
plants are also the small ones which would not have much impact on improving the power 
supply. The big ones remain struggling to reach financial closure. 
IPPs view poor revenue collection by the off-taker as a great risk as it affects the off-taker’s 
ability to pay for delivered power. 
 
4.2.2 Questionnaires 
The analysis of responses was done on the questions on the questionnaire and the analysis is 
tabulated and graphed below. Detailed analysis of these results is contained in section 4.3. The 
questionnaire is attached as appendix 4. 
Table 4.2: What is your understanding of the electricity sector with regard to the reforms, 
electricity pricing and system development issues? 
 
 Excellent Good Average Poor No Knowledge  
Respondent 
1 
  x   
Respondent 
2 
 x    
Respondent 
3 
 x    
Respondent 
4 
 x    
Respondent 
5 
 x    
Respondent 
6 
 x    
Respondent 
7 
 x    
Respondent 
8 
 x    
Respondent 
9 
  x   
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Respondent 
10 
  x   
Respondent 
11 
 x    
Respondent 
12 
 x    
 
 
The response to the question on the understanding of the ESI of the respondents indicates the 
majority have good understanding at 75%. 25% had average understanding. The result gives 
the researcher confidence that the responses are a reflection of how industry players view ESI 
reforms. The results can therefore be trusted as views of respondents who understand the 
subject matter. 
Table 4.3: How do you rate the level of independence of the regulator? 
 
Excellent Good Average Poor Very poor 
Respondent 1  x    
Respondent 2  x    
Respondent 3    x  
Respondent 4   x   
Respondent 5  x    
Respondent 6  x    
Respondent 7   x   
Respondent 8   x   
Respondent 9 x     
Respondent 10 x     
Respondent 11  x    
Respondent 12  x    
 
0%
75%
25%
What is your understanding of ESI
Excellent
Good
Average
Poor
No Knowledge at all
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17% of the respondents think that the independence of the regulator is excellent while half of 
the respondents think the regulator’s independence is good. 25% think the independence is 
average and 8% think its poor. There is no respondent who thought the independence is very 
poor. The responses give a view that the regulator is fairly independent. It shows that the 
regulator, in the view of industry players, has been able to carry out their duty as expected. 
This aspect is one of the key pillars of the framework requirements for investor confidence and 
analysis of the same will indicate how this has impacted on the investment in ESI in Zimbabwe. 
Table 4.4: How easy is it to go through the licensing process? 
 Very easy Easy Average Difficult Very difficult 
Respondent 1   x   
Respondent 2   x   
Respondent 3  x    
Respondent 4  x    
Respondent 5   x   
Respondent 6   x   
Respondent 7   x   
Respondent 8   x   
Respondent 9  x    
Respondent 10  x    
Respondent 11  x    
Respondent 12  x    
17%
50%
25%
8%0%
What is the level of independence of 
the regulator
Excellent
Good
Average
Poor
Very poor
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50% of respondents think that the ease of IPP licensing is easy while 50% think it’s on average. 
This indicates that the process is acceptable to investors and there are no impediments to 
investing in the sector emanating from the licensing process. 
Table 4.5: How easy is it to go through the power purchase agreement negotiation process? 
 Very easy Easy Average Difficult No Knowledge at all 
Respondent 1   x   
Respondent 2   x   
Respondent 3   x   
Respondent 4   x   
Respondent 5   x   
Respondent 6   x   
Respondent 7   x   
Respondent 8   x   
Respondent 9     x 
Respondent 10     x 
Respondent 11   x   
Respondent 12   x   
 
 
0%
50%50%
How easy is the licensing process
Very Easy
Easy
Average
Difficult
Very difficult
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83% of the respondents think that the ease of going through the tariff negotiation process is 
average. This indicates that the process does not quite support the IPPs. However, 17% have 
no knowledge of how the PPA negotiations are done. These were the respondents from the 
IPPs for own consumption. They do not have to go through PPA negotiation process. 
Table 4.6: How was the IPP  awarded contract to develop power plant? 
 Unsolicited bid Expansion of own assets Won a tender 
Respondent 1 x   
Respondent 2 x   
Respondent 3 x   
Respondent 4 x   
Respondent 5 x   
Respondent 6 x   
Respondent 7 x   
Respondent 8 x   
Respondent 9  x  
Respondent 10  x  
Respondent 11 x   
Respondent 12 x   
 
0%
83%
0%
17%
How easy is it to go through PPA 
negotiation process
Very easy
Easy
Average
Difficult
No Knowledge at all
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83% of the respondent IPPs developed their power stations through unsolicited bids while 17% 
were expanding their owns assets. These are the IPPs which were developed for own 
consumption. No IPP developed through a tender process. It is symptomatic of a market with 
deficit and requires quick to market solutions. There is not enough time to interrogate costs in 
this procurement strategy. This leads to the cost of procurement of the power being inefficient 
and may lead to high tariff requirement. 
The table below summarizes the questionnaire findings 
Table 4.7: Summary of Questionnaire findings 
 Understanding 
of ESI 
Regulatory 
Independence 
Licensing 
Processes 
PPA 
Negotiation 
Un/solicited 
Bid 
Respondent 1 average good  average average unsolicited 
Respondent 2 good good average average unsolicited 
Respondent 3 good poor easy average unsolicited 
Respondent 4 good average easy average unsolicited 
Respondent 5 good good average average unsolicited 
Respondent 6 good good average average unsolicited 
Respondent 7 good average average average unsolicited 
Respondent 8 good average average average unsolicited 
Respondent 9 average excellent easy not at all expansion 
Respondent 10 average excellent easy not at all expansion 
Respondent 11 good good easy average unsolicited 
Respondent 12 good good easy average  unsolicited 
 
In the following section, analysis of results is advanced. 
83%
17%
0%
How the IPP contract was awarded
Unsolicited bid
Expansion of own assets
Won a tender
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4.3 Detailed analysis of research findings 
The detailed analysis of the interview and questionnaire findings will be focused on the 
different aspects of the electricity sector reform that form the themes of the data gathering 
instruments and then the expected outcomes as outlined in the research questions. These themes 
have been outlined in the previous section and they will be analyzed in detail below. 
Independence of the regulator, tariff negotiation and tariff methodology 
From the point of view of IPPs and ZPC in the interviews, the majority believe that the 
regulator is independent. This view is also shared by respondents in the survey. The banks and 
the off-taker expressed reservations on the independence in practice though there was 
acknowledgement that the statutory provisions have enough safeguards. It was striking to note 
that the regulator itself feels stifled by the legal provisions which require that they consult the 
Minister on their decisions. Section 4 subsection 4 of the Energy Regulatory Authority Act 
reads: 
‘Subject to this Act, the Authority shall not, in the lawful exercise of its functions under this 
Act, be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority’. Zimbabwe (2011).  
This section clearly spells out the independence of the regulator. However, Section 24, 
subsections 1, 2 and 3 of the same Energy Regulatory Authority Act read: 
‘ (1) The Minister may give the Board such general directions in writing relating to the policy 
the Authority is to observe in the exercise of its functions as the Minister considers to be 
necessary in the national interest.  
(2) The Board shall take all necessary steps to comply with any direction given to it in terms 
of subsection (1).  
(3) When any direction has been given to the Board in terms of subsection (1), the Board shall 
ensure that the direction and any views the Board has expressed on it are set out in the 
Authority’s annual report’. Zimbabwe (2011). This section negates the provisions of section 4 
without even giving the regulator the option of refusing to take advice from the minister when 
they believe the advice is against common good, except to express it in the annual report. 
This is deemed to be a case of giving independence through the front door and taking it away 
through the back door. The MoEPD is of the view that the regulator cannot be too independent 
because government has to give policy direction.  This gives credence to the submission by the 
regulator that they were not independent. 
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This seems to explain why regulatory processes take longer than expected despite power 
producers and financiers viewing the regulator as independent. In reality, the regulator is not 
completely independent in the performance of its duties due to government interference. This 
interference results in the regulator taking a much longer period of time to make certain 
decisions in order to balance the expectations of government with those of the other 
stakeholders, to come to a decision that is fair. It may be said that the regulator is doing a good 
job under the circumstances. 
With regard to the tariff, there was general acceptance of the tariff methodology was acceptable 
as well as the tariff negotiation process as fair though it takes longer than expected to fully 
negotiate the PPA. 
This is a case where the principal, in this case the government, and the agent, the regulator, are 
at cross purposes in the principal-agent problem. While the government wants investment in 
the ESI and demonstrates that by instituting a sector reform agenda, there is obvious realization 
that a properly structured framework may be against the government need to protect the 
consumer. This protection is not always for the good of the customer but sometime for political 
capital. The regulator is trying to ensure the reforms are implemented as fairly as possible so 
as to improve the investor-friendliness of the ESI. The government loses the investment 
opportunities by crafting legal framework that has loopholes which look intentional. The agent 
does not deliver the service that is expected by the principal because the investor realizes that 
the legal framework is not water-tight enough to protect their investment. 
PPA negotiation and securitization requirements 
All IPPs in the interviews submitted that the PPA negotiation process is fair though it takes 
more time than anticipated. In the survey, the rating of the difficulty in concluding the 
negotiations was rated as average. The tariff component of the PPA is approved by the 
regulator. Part of the delay in concluding the PPA would then be caused by waiting for the 
tariff approval for incorporation in the PPA. The same issue of regulator independence would 
be at play as the regulator would be handling the government consultation process which needs 
to be done for every PPA 
There was unanimous agreement for the need for escrow accounts or/and government 
guarantees as securitization of the PPA. This clearly indicates concern by investors that there 
is a high risk that the off-taker may not pay for energy delivered. This is buttressed by the 
submission that the IPPs view revenue collection as the greatest challenge that the off-taker is 
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facing, further reflecting the prevalence of the payment risk for energy delivered. The opening 
of escrow accounts would involve assigning customers with foreign currency revenues to pay 
their bills in foreign currency into a local Foreign Currency Account (FCA) or an offshore 
account opened for the purpose of repaying the loan. Enough customers would need to be 
assigned to cover the periodic loan repayment amount plus some buffer.  
As long as the relationships between the regulator, off-taker, and IPPs are influenced by 
political interests, risks are high. Eberhard et al (2016) indicate that commercially sound 
metering, billing and revenue collection, over and above transparent, consistent and fair 
regulation would reduce the risk profile of a country. In a situation where the government can 
influence the collection capability of the off-taker and the regulator can do nothing about it, 
the principal agent problem again comes into play. The government’s effort to protect non-
paying customers for political expedience leads to diminishing capacity for the off-taker to pay 
for delivered energy thereby increasing the risk on the off-taker. Investors would then demand 
securitization measures that are punitive to the off-taker and this leads to failure of investment 
projects. 
Financiers’ view on the ESI reform. 
The view of the financiers was not consistent. While there is a feeling that the ESI would never 
be allowed by government to go bankrupt and that this is an incentive enough to invest, there 
is a view that the reforms have not been completed and the structure would be attractive were 
the next phase be implemented. This phase is when ZESA Holdings is disbanded and all the 
current subsidiaries report directly to the parent ministry. MoEPD explained that the reform 
had to be structured in a way where there is a Holding company so that ESI debt can be housed 
in ZESA Holdings to allow for subsidiaries to have clean balance sheets to enhance access to 
capital. This was also to allow arms’ length trading among subsidiaries while they develop 
capacity to trade commercially. The move to the next phase has been delayed by the protracted 
sub-optimal performance of the Zimbabwean economy. Eberhard et al (2016) explain that 
stable macroeconomic policies characterized by good repayment record, investment-grade 
rating and rule of law contribute to successful IPP investments. 
Improvement in capital investment and MW output 
From the information submitted by ZERA on table 4.1, 9 IPPs with installed capacity of 
121MW were licensed and operational. Of these, Triangle Estates (45MW) and Hippo Valley 
Estates (33MW) existed before the reforms. This leaves only 43.82MW having been 
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commissioned after the reforms. ZETDC submitted that they only dispatch a maximum of 
30MW from IPPs during the rainy season as the IPPs are largely mini hydro as submitted by 
the IPP respondents in appendix 1. This is outside the Triangle and Hippo Valley Estates 
(78MW) which is mainly for internal consumption.  
The fact that PPA securitization requires assignment of exporting customers would limit the 
amount of foreign currency cash flow available for securitizing IPP PPAs. There will be need 
for more customers with a solid payment record to support the bigger projects. This would 
explain why the smaller IPPs have been more successful than the big ones leading to small 
incremental MW output since the reforms. 
Impact of off-taker operations on investments by IPPs 
Revenue collection is poor, leading to debt accumulating to beyond US$1billion. When 
revenue is not collected, it compromises the implementation of critical aspects of the sector 
like maintenance, and then subsequent outages due to lack of maintenance cause revenue-
opportunity costs. The government has been to blame to a large extent, protecting consumers 
by instructing ZETDC not to discontinue service to defaulters. Access to capital is also 
affected, as funders require assurance that revenue from investment projects is collected when 
they consider funding the ESI. 
IPPs view the failure to collect revenue as the greatest challenge for the off-taker. It worries 
IPPs, as it poses a risk that they may not be paid for delivered power. This is aggravated by the 
below-cost tariff that the off-taker is awarded by the regulator. ZPC is not paid full invoice 
amounts for the power supplied as they are part of the revenue sharing strategy of ZESA 
Holdings, where the collected revenue is shared at a predetermined ratio so that the non-
collection of revenue does not harm ZETDC alone. The operating IPPs are paid their full 
invoice for delivered power according to terms of the PPA and securitization arrangements. 
There is generally no fear that the ESI structure where the off-taker is a sister company to ZPC, 
the government power producer under ZESA Holdings, could pose challenges in bias in 
dispatch. This may be so because there is power shortage in the market and all available power 
plants are largely dispatched. 
*** 
In summary of chapter 4, the research has found out that the reforms did not adequately cover 
investor requirements for independence of the regulator. There has not been power output 
improvement in the market after the reforms, neither was there significant investment in the 
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ESI. The off-taker’s inability to collect revenue has further complicated the securitization 
requirements by the investors to the extent that larger power plants have not been able to reach 
financial closure. Other socio-economic and political factors may have worsened the 
investment environment of the Zimbabwe ESI. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter will summarize the whole study from the research objectives, literature review, 
research methodology and the main findings. Main conclusions will be drawn from the key 
findings and recommendations for further study done. 
5.2 Summary of the study 
The objective of the study was: 
To investigate whether the reform of the Electricity Supply Industry in Zimbabwe has 
had an impact on investment in generation since 2002. 
The study adopted a mixed-methods approach to addressing the research questions and 
objectives, using the results of a survey questionnaire and interviews administered among a 
sample of respondents from the population of IPPs, development banks, ZETDC, ZPC, ZERA 
and MoEPD. The investigation was convergent parallel as the survey and interview was done 
simultaneously for each company to ensure respondents did not discuss the questions and result 
in biased responses. 
The key findings were: 
(i) The regulator is not fully independent from government, however they are doing a 
good job to balance the expectations of stakeholders given current institutional 
relationships between all actors. The government (principal) and the regulator 
(agent) suffer the principal-agent problem in the sense that the government wants 
to protect the consumer by blocking regulatory decisions while the regulator wants 
to exercise fairness and independence which will attract investment into the ESI. 
The result is working at cross purposes with the result of failing to attract investment 
into the sector as envisaged by the reforms. 
(ii) PPA negotiation processes are viewed to be fair but take more time than anticipated. 
Some possible reasons for this include consultation with government for 
concurrence as required by the ZERA Act. This is when the principal-agent problem 
is being debated and the asymmetric information reconciled. 
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(iii) Based on the outcomes of the interviews, it appears that escrow accounts and/or 
government guarantee to securitize PPAs would mitigate against agent risk. 
(iv) There has not been significant improvement in power output since the reforms were 
implemented. IPPs and ZPC have been able to license their generation projects but 
have failed to reach financial close so as to implement their projects. This has been 
attributed to the large size of the projects which need large capital outlay and 
financiers have not been keen to put large capital in one project in a high-risk 
environment. This has not done well to the development of the ESI. 
(v) ZETDC operations, especially revenue collection, are sending negative signals to 
the market on the credibility of the off-taker. The poor revenue collection is largely 
driven by government protectionist tendencies where ZETDC is not allowed to 
switch off certain customer categories, like farmers and mines, for nonpayment. 
The principal agent problem shows its head where the government as the principal 
expects to gain political capital by protecting customers and ZETDC as the agent is 
trying to collect what is due and maintain credibility of the sector.  However, the 
small IPPs that have managed to commission their plants are being paid their full 
invoice because of sound securitization measures that have been implemented. 
These measures have been limited to the small IPPs due to the limited number of 
well paying customers who can be assigned to pay their bills into an escrow 
account. 
5.3 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this section, a review and discussion of the reform process and components is presented and 
conclusions drawn on the impact of these reforms on investment in the sector. Recent or 
potential interventions which may improve some of the challenges discussed are also relayed. 
A final conclusion is drawn, before turning to the closure of the hypothesis test and providing 
suggestions for future research in the final sections of this chapter.  
The 2002 ESI reforms were largely driven by the failure of the Zimbabwe government to meet 
the capital investment requirements of the sector, which were critical to improve the quantity 
and quality of electricity supply. At the time when reforms were initiated, investors seemed to 
be crowding to countries with unbundled market structures, largely independent regulation and 
extensive participation of private sector (Besant-Jones, 2006). Investors had grown wary of 
government interference in sector entities, especially at operational level, as this increased risk. 
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Standard model reforms provided a new model, which was geared toward attracting investment 
by instituting some of the above reforms. Experience has shown, however, that reforms have 
not been implemented in full for political reasons. In many such cases, information asymmetry 
arises, as government continues to control information across the sector – using this justify the 
protections certain customer classes, protecting their own interests. This has certainly been the 
case in Zimbabwe.  
In Zimbabwe, the design and implementation of reforms did not adequately address many of 
the investor risks. In addition, because reforms have only partially been implemented, in effect 
two different models are in operation and what Gratwick and Eberhard term a ‘hybrid model’ 
exists (2008). This means that principal-agent relationships are highly complex, with many of 
the institutional rules not being followed. In this final concluding section, the disappointing 
outcomes of partial reforms on investment in generation, and to increasing generation capacity 
and output, are discussed. 
At the outset of reforms in Zimbabwe, a transitional structure was adopted were a holding 
company would hold all the shares in the subsidiary companies which would be running the 
generation, transmission and distribution components of the sector. This transitional structure 
was meant to facilitate the restructuring of legacy debt, as well as allow the subsidiaries to 
build capacity to trade commercially. Financial markets accepted this government strategy, and 
this is evidenced by the number of IPPs which got licensed on the backing of different financial 
institutions.  
The regulatory legislation was also crafted to give the required level of independence to the 
regulator. It is common that a regulator cannot be totally independent from government due to 
rules governing the relationship with the appointing authority. However, this poses a principal 
agent problem, as discussed in the previous chapter. To address this problem, it would likely 
be more effective if the regulator was to report to a different ministry to that to which other 
industry actors, especially ZETDC and state generation, report. This would minimize the 
negative impact of the consultations which the legislation calls for the regulator to do when 
passing decisions. This has impacted the ability of the country to raise tariffs to cost reflective 
levels and manage public and private sector relationships, so as to secure investment and 
improve sector performance. 
Revenue collection is the basis of good cash flow for a utility like ZETDC. Good cash flow 
ensures funding for critical activities like maintenance. If equipment is not maintained, 
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reliability of the network is compromised, leading to outages which lead to lost revenue 
opportunities. Diminishing revenue then justifies increased tariff requirements. The tariff may 
then end up increasing, because of failure to collect revenue. Investors in the sector want an 
assurance that the power delivered will be paid for. The assurance also comes in the ability of 
the off-taker to collect revenue for the service rendered. The prepayment system currently 
being implemented by ZETDC will go a long way in ensuring that revenue is collected. The 
current customer debt is too high, at above US$1 billion, to assure any investor that revenue 
will be collected. Poor revenue collection is a risk to investors as the project will not have cash 
flow to repay the loan. 
Despite reforms, legacy debt continues to effect the borrowing capacity of the ESI. Its 
resolution through possible rescheduling or taking over by government would create borrowing 
space for the sector to expand and refurbish the network. This could allow for measures that 
would increase electricity access as well as reliability of the existing network to be 
implemented. Legacy debt resolution is also in the way of moving to the next step of the 
reforms. This is because the strategy has been to house the debt in the Holding company and 
allow subsidiaries access to capital while the economic environment of the country improves. 
Many of the factors discussed above have contributed to a situation where only small IPPs have 
managed to reach financial closure and commission their projects. It shows that financiers have 
not been keen on putting huge sums of money into a single transaction. This is considered to 
have more risk, considering the wider economic environment and the size of the Zimbabwean 
economy itself, which is not big enough to support such projects. Legacy debt issues, as well 
as revenue collection capability of the off-taker, certainly curtail the appetite of financiers for 
big projects. 
This research also suggests that there has been a failure to link planning to procurement. All 
the IPPs which are supplying the grid were developed as unsolicited bids. This is done by 
governments, especially in a situation of power shortage, as it shortens the procurement 
process. It is, however, inefficient and always results in higher tariff. An auction system is a 
promising option if the country is to ensure tariffs are contained, but this requires up-to-date 
planning and robust procurement systems need to be put in place. Experience in other countries 
has shown that, like regulation, some independence can go a long way to achieving this by 
reducing information asymmetry between public and private players and managing the 
different interests of actors. 
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In conclusion, the 2002 reforms can be considered successful in that they improved the 
investment attractiveness of the ESI with 33 projects totaling 7,603.22MW being licensed. The 
impact on generation capacity, however, has been limited with only 121.82MW being 
commissioned. This leaves the objectives of the reforms largely unfulfilled as power shortage 
stubbornly persists, with funding for larger projects of greater impact remaining elusive. The 
government has to address three major issues which are negatively affecting investment in 
bigger projects. Firstly, retail tariffs are perceived to be below cost. Investors need the ESI to 
be sustainable for them to commit funds. Cost reflective tariffs are the hallmark of 
sustainability assessments. There has either got to be cost rationalization of the ESI through 
reviewing cost drivers like staff costs and industry structure or reviewing the tariff upwards.  
Secondly, revenue collection challenges by the off-taker have to be effectively addressed. 
Third, the reforms have to be progressed as planned to address current bottlenecks associated 
with the revenue sharing model and legacy debt. There is further need for greater regulatory 
independence to ensure the inconsistencies that are in the current regulations are addressed. 
This is inhibiting development of bigger projects which require large capital investment.  
5.4 Hypothesis Test  
The ESI has failed to post significant improvement in power output over the period 2000 to 
2016 after the promulgation of the ESI reforms. While the ESI players submitted that the 
regulator was largely independent, the concerns of the regulator that they were not independent 
could be demonstrated by illustration from the Regulatory Authority Act. In excess of 
8000MW capacity power plants were licensed but less than 200MW were developed and 
commission over the period. Imports continued to be the means to close the gap between 
demand and local supply. 
It can therefore be concluded that the null hypothesis, that ‘The reform of the Electricity 
Supply Industry in Zimbabwe has positively impacted on investment in the power sector 
since 2002’ should be rejected in favour of the alternative which is:  The reform of the 
Electricity Supply Industry in Zimbabwe has not had a significant impact on investment 
in the power sector since 2002. Nevertheless, the fact that private sector has shown strong 
interest in investing – more than 12 IPPs– is positive, and shows that there is potential for the 
reforms to have an impact by attracting private sector investment. If reforms were implemented 
as planned and included measures to improve the performance of ZETDC, independence of the 
regulator, and provide mitigation measures for agent (IPP) risk, it is likely that some of the 
blockages to harnessing this potential might be reduced.  
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5.5 Recommendations for future research 
From the conclusions drawn from this research, the following recommendations are made for 
future research: 
(i)  The legacy debt of the ESI has stifled investment and progress of the reforms. It 
will be necessary to research into the possible ways of resolving this debt. 
(ii) A study be carried out to establish the exact conditions that will be necessary to 
advance the reforms to the next level. There is no clarity as to what conditions the 
government would want to proceed to the next step of the reforms, where ZESA 
Holdings will be collapsed and the generation, transmission and distribution 
components of the ESI are run as separate entities. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Interview responses from IPPs 
Respondent IPP1 
Question Response 
How many power stations do you 
own? 
One 
What technologies do you use for 
power generation? 
Thermal 
What influenced the idea? Shortfall of power in the country. Legislation 
allowed for IPPs. We got our own coal 
concession so that we won’t depend on 3rd 
parties for coal supply. 
How much have you invested so far? USD12 million 
What is your view of the 
independence of the Regulator? 
The regulator cannot take independent 
decisions, and has to refer all decisions to the 
parent ministry. The fact that ZPC, ZETDC 
and Regulator report to the same ministry 
makes independence of the Regulator 
unachievable. 
How do you view the PPA negotiation 
process? 
PPA negotiations are fair, and cover all IPP 
concerns. They however take much longer 
than anticipated. 
Tariff negotiation process and tariff 
methodology 
Tariff methodology is acceptable, and the 
IPP only has to prove efficient costs. 
Payment for delivered power Not yet operational 
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PPA securitization requirements There is a need for an escrow account or a 
government guarantee. 
Challenges in the initial stages of the 
project. 
There have been several shareholding 
changes which greatly affected fundraising 
activities. 
What do you think the challenges of 
the off-taker are, and how can this be 
fixed? 
Revenue collection has to improve to assure 
power producers that they will be paid for 
power delivered. 
Electrification rate is slow and yet we are 
developing large power stations in 
anticipation of load growth. This could be a 
chicken and egg situation though. ZETDC 
may then need to facilitate our export to the 
region 
What do you see as the greatest 
challenges in investing in the 
Zimbabwean power sector?  
Ease of doing business and policy 
inconsistence. 
 
How do financiers view the reformed 
structure of the sector in terms of 
attractiveness?  
Financiers can’t separate Zesa Holdings, 
ZETDC and ZPC. As a result, it becomes 
difficult to align the structure required by 
financiers and the structure of the Zimbabwe 
ESI. 
What challenges do you think your 
competitors are facing?  
The biggest challenge is funding. 
 
What advice would you give to 
someone who would want to invest 
in the sector?  
They should invest to cover the internal 
generation gap of the country.  
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Respondent IPP2 
Question Response 
How many power stations do you 
own? 
One 
What technologies do you use for 
power generation? 
Thermal 
What influenced the idea? Shortfall of power in the country and the 
campaign by government for investment in 
energy.  
Legislation allowed for IPPs.  
How much have you invested so far? USD8 million 
What is your view of the 
independence of the Regulator? 
The regulator fairly independent 
 
How do you view the PPA negotiation 
process? 
PPA negotiations take too long but are fair in 
their coverage of essential IPP concerns 
Tariff negotiation process and tariff 
methodology 
Tariff methodology is acceptable, and the 
IPP only has to prove efficient costs. 
Payment for delivered power Not yet operational 
PPA securitization requirements There is a need for an escrow account or a 
government guarantee. 
Challenges in the initial stages of the 
project. 
Securing mining concession and generation 
license.  
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What do you think the challenges of 
the off-taker are, and how can this be 
fixed? 
There is need to have a strong off-taker 
balance sheet for credibility to offtake from 
large power plants like PER Lusulu. 
Revenue collection and demand growth are 
key.  
What do you see as the greatest 
challenges in investing in the 
Zimbabwean power sector?  
Perceived country risk and the 
macroeconomic environment 
 
How do financiers view the reformed 
structure of the sector in terms of 
attractiveness?  
The reform has ring fenced the generation 
subsector and introduced the regulator. This 
should improve the attractiveness. 
What challenges do you think your 
competitors are facing?  
The biggest challenge is funding. 
 
What advice would you give to 
someone who would want to invest 
in the sector?  
They should invest to cover the internal 
generation gap of the country.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  - 77 - 
 
Respondent IPP3 
Question Response 
How many power stations do you 
own? 
One 
What technologies do you use for 
power generation? 
Thermal 
What influenced the idea? We realized there was a shortfall of power in 
the country. New public utility could not do 
it alone. Legislation allowed for IPPs. We 
applied for a coal concession, which we got. 
ZPC was struggling to get coal from 3rd 
parties, so our model was to self-provide. 
How much have you invested so far? USD20 million 
What is your view of the 
independence of the Regulator? 
The regulator cannot take independent 
decisions, and has to refer all decisions to the 
parent ministry. The fact that ZPC, ZETDC 
and Regulator report to the same ministry 
makes independence of the Regulator 
unachievable. 
 
How do you view the PPA negotiation 
process? 
PPA negotiations are fair, and cover all IPP 
concerns. 
 
Tariff negotiation process and tariff 
methodology 
Tariff methodology is acceptable, and the 
IPP only has to prove efficient costs. 
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Payment for delivered power Not yet operational 
PPA securitization requirements There is a need for an escrow account or a 
government guarantee. 
 
Challenges in the initial stages of the 
project. 
The model required that the company does 
coal mining and constructs a dam for water 
supply. Getting government approval for the 
coal mining and dam construction was a big 
challenge. 
 
What do you think the challenges of 
the off-taker are, and how can this be 
fixed? 
Revenue collection. A lot of interference in 
collection efforts. A good off-taker on paper, 
but bad at providing the means to pay for 
delivered power. People not paying, and 
ZETDC can’t pay the invoices. ZETDC has 
to facilitate exports instead. There is a lot of 
transfer pricing, as ZETDC and ZPC are part 
of the same group of companies.  
 
What do you see as the greatest 
challenges in investing in the 
Zimbabwean power sector?  
Ease of doing business and policy 
inconsistence. 
 
How do financiers view the reformed 
structure of the sector in terms of 
attractiveness?  
Financiers can’t separate Zesa Holdings, 
ZETDC and ZPC. As a result, it becomes 
difficult to align the structure required by 
financiers and the structure of the Zimbabwe 
ESI. 
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What challenges do you think your 
competitors are facing?  
The biggest challenge is funding. 
 
What advice would you give to 
someone who would want to invest 
in the sector?  
They should invest to cover the internal 
generation gap of the country.  
 
 
Respondent IPP4 
Question Response 
How many power 
stations do you own? 
Five 
What technologies do 
you use for power 
generation? 
Mini-hydro 
 
What motivated the 
investment idea? 
 
It was started in 2005-2007, triggered by investors who 
were interested in tea estates in Honde Valley in the Eastern 
Highlands. Electricity supply was poor, and they wanted to 
construct mini hydro power stations for self-supply. It was 
later realized that it was good to have a stand-alone 
company to do power generation and supply excess power 
to the grid, as the revision of Electricity Act allowed for 
this. While there were some IPPs before this time, it was 
made easier by the new Act.  
How much have you 
invested so far?  
$40m 
How independent is 
the regulator? 
The regulator (ZERC) was ineffective, as the members 
would just rubberstamp the negotiated position between IPP 
and off-taker. No independence was therefore exercised. 
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 All decisions were referred to the minister and cabinet, and 
the regulator was often embarrassed by being overruled. 
Investors need certainty on the effectiveness of the 
regulator. The current regulator, ZERA is fairly 
independent. 
PPA negotiation 
process. 
 
Off-taker negotiation process of PPA is good, though it 
takes too long. We should now have a standard PPA. 
Negotiation should not take more than 2 weeks. PPA term 
is also in line with loan tenor. 
Tariff negotiation 
process and tariff 
methodology. 
Tariff is effectively negotiated between off-taker and 
power producer and reviewed and approved by ZERA. 
Tariff methodology is good, as it ensures cost recovery 
plus a return. However, cost of capital is too high and 
beyond view of  the market so that it ends up with a high 
tariff requirement. Loan tenor is also short. 
Payment for delivered 
power 
 
Invoices are being paid on time due to a good payment 
mechanism which is in place. All power stations are linked 
to the mechanism and there are no complaints on payments. 
Without it, there would be a problem. It also means the off-
taker follows the clauses of the contract. The biggest worry 
is the ability of the off-taker to pay, given the perennial loss-
making position.  
PPA securitization 
requirements 
We have escrow arrangements with the offtaker 
Challenges in the 
initial stages of the 
project 
 
Load shedding posed challenges for embedded generators 
in the initial years. Lack of a direct communication link 
with the control centre and the general unreliability of the 
distribution network meant that the distribution loads that 
are fed by the embedded generators would be lost without 
notice. A lot of blind faith was needed to go into further 
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investments. Hyper-inflation was also such that no one 
would come in at the time, as there was no knowledge of 
what the tariff would be, though the tariff methodology was 
good. The off-taker was also supportive of IPPs. 
 
What do you think are 
the challenges of the 
off-taker and how can 
this be fixed? 
 
The economic environment is depressed and capital flow 
looks beyond the sector itself. There is limited knowledge 
of the reality on the ground to take advantage of the good 
reform structure ahead of the macroeconomic environment. 
Consumers are not paying for service and the off-taker 
becomes constrained for cash flow. All those who owe 
should be on prepaid system and should pay their debt. 
 
What do you see as 
the greatest challenges 
in investing in the 
Zimbabwean power 
sector?  
 
Understanding the local terrain and reconciling reality with 
perception. The perception of risk from the perspective of 
international financial institutions is worse than reality. 
 
How do financiers 
view the reformed 
structure of the sector 
in terms of 
attractiveness?  
 
Reforms were to encourage IPP investment. The reforms 
are properly structured to achieve this, though it is a work 
in progress. It hasn’t achieved the results sought, and it 
failed because of the perception of the country. 
 
What challenges do 
you think your 
competitors are 
facing?  
The biggest challenge they face is access to capital. 
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What advice would 
you give to someone 
who would want to 
invest in the sector?  
I would simply tell them to come and invest, as 
there are good opportunities, given our experience. 
 
 
Respondent IPP5 
Question Response 
How many power stations do you own? 
 
One power station with 2x330MW 
generators 
What technologies do you use for power 
generation? 
 
Thermal 
What influenced the idea? 
 
The idea was triggered by the shortage 
of electricity in the various countries 
within the Southern African Power Pool 
(SAPP) 
 
How much have you invested so far? 
 
Roughly $6 million in development 
costs  
How do you rate the Independence of 
Regulator? 
 
There isn’t any doubt about the 
Regulator's independence. However, this 
entity is under heavy strain due to 
funding constraints. 
 
How do you rate the PPA negotiation 
process? 
 
The process has been time consuming, 
probably because IPPs are still a 
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relatively new concept, particularly in 
baseload scenarios, within Africa.  
 
Tariff negotiation process and tariff 
methodology 
Negotiation process also takes time but 
the tariff methodology is good. 
Are Payments for delivered power done 
on time? 
 
Power is still to be delivered to the 
ZETDC 
 
What are your PPA securitization 
requirements? 
 
The primary requirement is for 
bankability. The PPA terms and 
conditions, as well as the counterparties 
must be acceptable to lenders and 
investors.  The closer to the revenue 
source the better. 
 
What were the challenges in the initial 
stages of the project? 
 
Our biggest challenges are still the 
finalization of the PPA. 
 
What do you think the challenges of the 
off-taker are, and how can this be fixed? 
 
The biggest challenge is the availability 
of capital and a solid balance sheet, as 
well as the efficient collection of 
revenues.  This can be fixed by the total 
installation of pre-paid electricity meters 
to all customers, and sound balance sheet 
management. 
 
What do you see as the greatest 
challenges in investing in the 
Zimbabwean power sector?  
 
Payment risk and slow economic growth. 
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How do financiers view the reformed 
structure of the sector in terms of 
attractiveness?  
 
The sector holds much promise, but 
external investors perceive the local laws 
to be unpredictable. 
 
What challenges do you think your 
competitors are facing?  
 
Access to capital given the perceived 
country risk 
What advice would you give to someone 
who would want to invest in the sector?  
 
It is the time to invest as the future looks 
bright 
 
Respondent IPP6 
Question 
Response 
How many power stations do you own? 
 
1 
What technologies do you use for power 
generation? 
 
Biomass 
What influenced the idea? 
 
Power shortages 
How much have you invested so far? 
 
Around $1million 
How do you rate the Independence of 
Regulator? 
 
The regulator is fairly independent 
How do you rate the PPA negotiation 
process? 
 
Not applicable 
How easy is the tariff negotiation process 
and tariff methodology. 
 
This does not apply 
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Are Payments for delivered power done 
on time? 
 
Power is for internal consumption 
What are your PPA securitization 
requirements? 
 
We have no PPA 
What were the challenges in the initial 
stages of the project? 
 
Funding 
What do you think the challenges of the 
off-taker are, and how can this be fixed? 
 
Non-payment of bills. Government 
support is required to enforce payment 
What do you see as the greatest 
challenges in investing in the 
Zimbabwean power sector?  
 
Funding 
 
How do financiers view the reformed 
structure of the sector in terms of 
attractiveness?  
A little positive though not certain in 
future due to politics 
 
What challenges do you think your 
competitors are facing? 
Capital to enhance project performance 
 
What advice would you give to someone 
who would want to invest in the sector?  
 
Trade carefully but it is the best avenue 
to get into since we anticipate power 
shortage in the near future. 
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Interview responses from non IPPs 
 
ZPC 
Question Response 
When were you unbundled out of the 
vertically integrated ZESA? 
 
2003 
How did the reforms of 2002 affect the 
operations of ZPC? 
 
We now have to have power purchase 
agreements with ZETDC, unlike in the 
past. We also needed more commercial 
arrangements to access some skills in 
operating the plant. 
 
What were the objectives of the 
reforms? 
 
To unbundle ESI so as to allow private 
players in generation, as well as to 
introduce a regulator. 
 
How did the reforms affect your access 
to capital? 
 
Only the ZPC balance sheet was to 
support access to capital. 
 
How fair do you find the regulator on 
issues to do with the off-taker, IPPs and 
yourselves? 
 
The legal instruments spell out proper 
independence of the regulator, and we 
have largely found the regulator to be 
independent. Some controversial 
decisions would be from the government 
whose involvement is also provided for 
in the Act. 
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How many power stations have you 
managed to build since reforms and how 
many MW have you managed to add to 
the grid? 
 
No new power station has been 
constructed, but Hwange has been 
rehabilitated and output improved by 
300MW. Construction of Kariba 
extension is 60%, and will add 300MW 
in 2018. 
 
Are you being paid for the power 
delivered?  
 
We are not being paid for delivered 
power in full and we are owed over 
USD700 million. 
Is ZETDC not paying all producers or 
it’s selectively ZPC, and why? 
 
We are using a revenue sharing model 
and we don’t get the full payment 
because ZETDC cannot collect all the 
revenue for reasons largely beyond their 
means. Government protects some 
customers for being in sensitive and 
subdued industrial sectors, and some are 
just unable to pay. IPPs are largely paid 
according to terms of their PPAs, 
probably to give a perception of good off-
taker. 
 
What is the impact on non-payment?  
 
Maintenance of plant is not done 
timeously and properly due to poor cash 
flows, and the result is frequent 
breakdowns, which cause more costs. It 
increases the tariff requirement as costs 
escalate. 
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What mechanism would you think best 
applies to ensuring payment? 
 
Escrow accounts are demanded by 
funders, but ring fenced local accounts 
also work. LCs and bank guarantees also 
work, but they need to be funded, and 
this is the handicap of the off-taker. 
 
 
 
ZETDC 
Question Response 
How has the reform of 2002 affected the 
operations of the off-taker? 
 
It has created more awareness in terms 
of power quality issues. The fact that 
there is someone watching changes the 
way the system is run. Economic 
dispatch has to be closely monitored, as 
there are more players. 
 
How active has been the development of 
power sources since reforms? 
 
Only small IPPs have been constructed 
but there have been many discussions, 
and even PPA negotiations with bigger 
ones. The reason is that the tariff of the 
off-taker is below cost and the off-taker 
may not be able to pay the invoice for 
energy delivered. They are aware that the 
off-taker is not recouping the full cost. 
Country risk perceptions are also playing 
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a part, as most of the money is from 
international DFIs. 
 
How are the dispatch arrangements of 
generation companies, and are they 
successful arrangements? 
 
Economic order dispatch is used. Has 
been successful to the extent that, due to 
the shortage of power, all sources are 
always needed. 
 
How many IPPs are you dispatching 
now, and how many MW are they 
contributing? 
 
They are 9 in total, and they give about 
30MW during summer and less than 
5MW during winter. 
 
What aspects of the reform are 
supportive to the off-taker’s access to 
capital? 
 
Ring fencing risks associated with off-
taker and focusing on investments in the 
specialized transmission and distribution 
sector make it easier for evaluation by 
financiers, as they lend to the off-taker. 
 
The transmission company and 
distribution company were initially 
separate. What motivated their 
bundling? 
 
This is good for the size of the economy 
and the stage of development of the 
industry. While it is good to keep them 
separate, the economy was small at the 
time and the overheads associated with 
running the 2 companies separately were 
not justified.  
 
Are the reforms conducive to investment 
in the generation subsector? 
It is conducive, as it separates entities. 
Investors can invest in generation as 
private players with separate balance 
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 sheets, which can be used to access 
financing. 
 
Is the Regulator independent?  
 
Practically no, but theoretically yes. The 
regulator has to toe the line of the parent 
ministry, which is the same as the off-
taker. Government naturally is mandated 
to protect the people from expensive 
service. Aspects like tariff review suffer 
because the same ministry supervises the 
regulator. It would have been better if the 
regulator was to report to the President’s 
office. In theory, the Act is crafted to give 
independence to the regulator. 
 
Have you been able to collect all the 
revenue billed? If not, how much is 
owed? 
 
Collections are very poor. The reason is 
that ministry as government has to 
protect the interests of the consumer. The 
government intervenes when the utility 
wants to disconnect customers for non-
payment, leading to accumulation of 
debt. The utility is sacrificed to appease 
the consumer. Around $1.1billion is 
owed. 
 
How has the debtors’ book size affected 
your ability to securitize PPAs for IPPs? 
 
It has negatively affected ability. The 
perception created is that when the power 
is delivered by power producers, there 
may be no payment for it if the revenue 
is not collected, resulting in default in 
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paying invoices. Securitization will have 
limited scope because of cash flow 
constraints, and the instruments then 
require cash cover. 
 
How do you securitize? 
 
Government guarantees for public sector 
investments. IPPs accept escrow 
accounts, assigning customers to pay into 
a ring-fenced account, LCs and other 
work-around hybrid instruments. 
 
What securitization measures have you 
been able to implement to ensure 
securitization of PPAs and how 
successful have they been? 
 
Preference has been ring fenced 
accounts with a local bank, because it is 
difficult to open a foreign account due 
to central bank requirements. Capacity 
constraints on the banking sector have 
also constrained securitization for larger 
IPPs, as no local bank can pull together 
the required amount, as either guarantee 
or LC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ZERA 
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Question Response 
How was regulation of ESI achieved 
prior to formation of ZERC in 2002? 
 
Zesa was regulating the industry. 
Operator was the regulator especially in 
terms of determining the prices. 
Operator was vertically integrated 
including determining prices.  
 
What motivated the ESI reforms of 
2002? 
 
Government needed augmentation in 
investment in the sector. Government 
had to do Hwange with YTL and 
Sengwa with National Power of UK and 
failed. There was realisation that there 
was need to get private sector to do 
projects. 
 
What is your view of the structure of the 
reformed ESI, the companies formed 
and their interrelationship as a group? 
 
Separation of companies is the ultimate 
thing, with registered companies trading 
at arm’s length.  
 
How independent is the regulator? Challenge is that regulator and ZESA 
report to the same ministry so 
compromise is defined where the needs 
of the minister as the owner may be 
given precedence over reasonability. 
The provision of the Act spells out that 
the regulator should not be influenced, 
and the other that says the minister may 
give policy directive, as well as that the 
regulator should give solutions in 
consultation with the minister. 
 
What issues in the ESI do you think 
need to be regulated? 
 
Licensing, tariff, quality, safety, 
operations. 
 
Have all these issues had policies put in 
place to regulate the ESI? 
 
Not yet. More than 30 regulations are 
required, and a few of them are being 
developed on the basis of their priority. 
 
How easy is it for industry players to 
comply? 
There are no big challenges with the 
existing regulations. 
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How much do you think reform has 
affected the investment climate? 
 
IPPs are now allowed and it has created 
interest, and this was not there before. 
IPPs are now also allowed to sell 
directly to consumers though there is no 
such IPP at the moment. 
 
What was the motivation behind the 
formation of ZERA from ZERC? 
 
Electricity is just one part of the energy, 
and there was need for a regulator who 
would look at the entire energy 
portfolio. At the, time there was need to 
appoint a regulator for petroleum when 
it was decided that the energy regulator 
be the one to be in charge of both. 
 
Was it a good move in your view? 
 
Yes. These structures have no need to be 
duplicated in view of the attendant costs. 
 
Has regulation been enhanced as a 
result? 
 
It does not take away the focus on 
electricity as there are people focusing 
on electricity. Principles used are the 
same.  
 
How many licensees are there to date? 
 
This will be provided as a separate 
schedule 
How much power has been added to the 
grid since reforms? 
 
This will be provided as a separate 
schedule 
How much money has been invested 
since the 2002 reforms? 
 
This will be provided as a separate 
schedule 
 
 
 
MoEPD 
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Question Response 
What were the objectives of the 
reform of 2002? 
 
Primarily, to address the allowance of 
other players to be involved, especially 
in generation, as the public sector was 
unable to cover the generation gap. It 
was also to improve the corporate 
governance of the sector by reviewing 
the Executive Chairman-led board of 
directors. The sector would be 
separated into generation, transmission 
and distribution companies, with a 
regulator supervising on the sector. 
 
What was the rationale of the merging 
of Transmission and Distribution 
companies in 2007? 
 
There had been no investment in the 
sector due to a deteriorating economic 
environment. There was a need to 
reduce the executive staff cost by 
merging the two companies, and 
cutting the number of directors from 7 
to 3, and MDs from two to one, as well 
as removing one board altogether. 
 
How independent is the regulator?  
 
It is not practical for the regulator to be 
totally independent of government. The 
Energy Regulatory Act calls for the 
consultation of the regulator with the 
government. This is where the balance 
is lost. Political interventions are then 
taken, with the excuse that they are 
consultations which are provided for in 
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the Act. They are there because of the 
economic environment.  The Electricity 
Act also requires ministers to give 
policy advice. This then has the same 
impact as the Energy Regulatory Act, in 
allowing political interference. The 
Regulator is very independent from a 
governance point of view.   PPA tariffs 
are deliberated on by regulator and the 
ZERA board sits to approve, which 
clearly shows independence. Though 
government is consulted last, feedback 
still comes back to ZERA. The 
regulator has not been consistently seen 
to be independent, as there have been 
public pronouncements by politicians 
on issues that are supposed to be the 
mandate of the regulator. 
 
What is the envisaged reform process 
by government?  
 
The sector would be divided into 
generation, transmission and 
distribution under a holding company. 
The holding company was meant as a 
short-term measure to manage legacy 
debt and supervise a framework where 
subsidiaries would be able to share 
revenue until they are able to trade. The 
arrangement was meant to last 3 years. 
The next step was then to dissolve 
holdings and have the subsidiaries 
report to MoEPD directly.  
 
  - 96 - 
How far has the reform process gone?  
 
There has been no meaningful progress 
in the transformation of the structure, as 
a result of the economic environment 
remaining subdued. It is the reason why 
the Electricity Act of 2013 was not 
implemented. There is still a long way 
to go in the implementation of the 
reforms.   
 
The current state of having ZESA 
Holdings does not take the off-taker 
far away enough to assure IPPs that 
there will not be dispatch favoritism 
of ZPC. What are your views on that?  
 
The off-taker has had a good record in 
adhering to commercial agreements, to 
the point that it can be said that the 
off-takers have demonstrated that they 
are above that possible compromise. 
 
Why was the electricity act of 2013 
not implemented?  
 
The Act largely was going to dissolve 
Zesa Holdings and separate 
Transmission from Distribution and 
have all subsidiary companies reporting 
directly to MoEPD. It is the position of 
government that Transmission and 
Distribution should be separate, and 
this should be the next step in the 
reform agenda. Government views that 
this structure will give better results 
when the economy is performing above 
current levels. The individual 
companies could not effectively trade, 
and the legacy debt issue had not been 
resolved. 
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What are the government’s views on 
the perennial loss-making position of 
off-taker? 
 
Loss position has to be turned around. 
There is a drive towards cost reflective 
tariff to ensure the viability of off-taker. 
They are trying to achieve the tariff step 
by step. Stakeholders are still debating 
the cost structure of the off-taker. While 
tariff increase is necessary, costs have 
to be incurred efficiently, as this could 
be the driver of the loss position.  
 
What is the impact of the off-taker 
being owed over USD1 billion by 
consumers? 
 
When revenue is not collected, it 
compromises the implementation of 
critical aspects of the sector like 
maintenance, and then subsequent 
outages due to lack of maintenance 
cause revenue-opportunity costs. The 
government has been to blame to a 
large extent through the protection 
tendencies of consumers by instructing 
ZETDC not to discontinue service to 
defaulters. Government is now behind 
the off-taker to ensure that revenue is 
collected. Public pronouncements have 
been made by government encouraging 
defaulters to pay. There has also been 
support of the prepayment metering 
system. Prepayment arrests growth of 
debt. Recovery of debt is also instituted 
by deducting 50% of all prepayment 
purchases through the system. Offset of 
parastatals’ debt with tax obligation has 
also been approved, where off-taker tax 
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obligations are used to offset the debt of 
government electricity debt, thereby 
ensuring public companies’ payment. 
There is, however, difficulty in getting 
some sensitive customers to pay whom 
the government continues to protect for 
the reasons that they are in critical 
sectors. 
 
How has private capital responded to 
the reforms of the ESI?  
 
There has not been much, in part 
because of the economic challenges. 
Generation would have benefited by 
now, but it has not happened. Only 
small IPPs have been attracted. The off-
taker has been paying for power 
delivered, and this has sent a very good 
message. The off-taker has been 
honoring commercial agreements. 
 
What is the procurement process of 
prospective IPPs on the System 
Development Plan (SDP)?  
 
The procurement has largely been 
through unsolicited bids. This is 
obviously an expensive way of doing it 
but the government had to respond to 
the shortage, as there has been load 
shedding for many years. No SDP has 
been officially approved for many years 
now. 
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Before the reforms there were IPPs. 
How were IPPs regulated before the 
2002 ESI reforms?  
 
They were regulated by ZESA through 
the guideline which said that anybody 
generating should sell at 85% of retail 
tariff. ZESA would also license all 
IPPs producing more than 100kVA.  
 
 
 
Respondent Bank1 
 
Question Response 
What is your mandate insofar as 
infrastructure development is 
concerned? 
 
Investment banking and long-term 
solution for corporate clients. 
Infrastructure is one of the core sectors 
which include power & infrastructure; 
this is actually a theme in which the bank 
has realized there is a gap. The bank has 
not invested enough in power and 
infrastructure, so the quota remains 
underperformed. This is because of the 
country’s risk, which makes it difficult to 
sell outside the country, for external 
support. 
 
How have you been involved in the 
power sector? 
 
Corporate banking and advisory. 
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What structural issues of ESI do you 
consider when you want to invest in the 
ESI? 
 
Sustainability, ability to charge economic 
tariff, reliability of supply and ability to 
collect.  Environmental impacts are also 
highly considered, as they conform to 
equator principles. 
 
How attractive do you find the reforms 
of 2002 to investment? 
 
The fact that the energy sector can never 
go under makes it an attractive sector, 
which may be restructured from time to 
time 
 
How independent do you think the 
regulator is? 
 
To the extent that they report to the same 
ministry as the entities that they regulate, 
their independence is greatly 
compromised.  
 
How many IPPs have you funded in the 
sector? 
 
There has only been one success story. 
Others have not been able to bring 
bankable feasibility studies. Some of 
them are oversized for the comfort of the 
lenders, who are not prepared to bring in 
much money into the country at this time. 
There is also a lake of equity, for 
borrowers and lenders do not want to lend 
to a borrower who has not put in anything 
in the project. Lenders are also not 
comfortable with a single buyer model as 
it does not give flexibility in the off-take 
of produced power. 
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Have you been funding ZESA projects 
and if so how much? 
 
Yes, in corporate loans targeting 
generation and transmission projects.  
How much have you invested in the 
ESI? 
 
ZAR 500 million in the last 2 years, plus 
a current $10m. 
 
Does the structure where ZETDC and 
ZPC are under the same holding 
company compromise dispatch fairness 
between IPPs and the ZPC? 
 
IPPs have not reported any preferential 
treatment over the ZPC. There are 
therefore no direct concerns from the 
IPPs we are dealing with. 
 
Is there anything you think should be 
done to enhance the attractiveness of the 
ESI? 
 
Tariff should be cost reflective for 
investors to be attracted.  The balance 
sheet is shrouded with a lot of legacy 
issues, affecting borrowing power. It 
therefore needs restructuring. 
 
 
Respondent Bank2 
Question Response 
What is your mandate in as far as 
infrastructure development is concerned? 
 
The statutory mandate set out in terms of 
our enabling Act is to mobilize resources 
for deployment and investment in key 
infrastructure required to stimulate 
economic growth across the country in 
critical sectors which include, but are not 
limited to, energy; transport; water & 
sanitation; housing and ICTs. This also 
includes a mandate to build and 
strengthen institutional capacity for 
entities or implementing agencies 
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involved in the infrastructure value chain 
in Zimbabwe. 
 
How have you been involved in the 
power sector? 
 
The bank has funded transformative 
projects in the energy sector such as the 
introduction of the pre-paid metering 
systems for energy consumers to enhance 
collection by the power utility against 
billed consumption of energy on the 
distribution side. We have also funded 
refurbishment and repowering projects 
for existing power plants to improve 
reliability and power generation levels 
from installed generation capacity. 
 
What structural issues of ESI do you 
consider when you want to invest in the 
ESI? 
 
We consider the structure of the market 
and bankability/credit quality of the off-
take under power purchase agreements 
for power produced from funded 
projects. Mitigation of possible 
inefficiencies born out of a single-buyer 
market for national grid off-take versus a 
liberalized (and competitive) market in 
which all power producers, whether state 
owned or private sector owned, can sell 
power directly to their chosen quality 
customers. Tariff adjudication is still 
more mired with interventionist practices 
than open market determinants accepted 
by the Regulator. The current structure of 
our energy supply industry needs to be 
streamlined to enhance efficiencies, 
which will in turn create savings for 
additional investment in new value 
adding projects for the sector; at the same 
time attracting the badly needed private 
sector investment in the ESI. 
 
How attractive do you find the reforms 
of 2002 to investment? 
 
The conceived reforms were positive in 
that individual and more focused 
Strategic Business Units were set up to 
concentrate on generation on the one 
hand and transmission and distribution 
on the other. The only challenge is that 
the reforms were partially implemented 
with the full unbundling of the 
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monopolistic state-owned power utility 
being left incomplete, and therefore still 
constraining optimal attraction of 
investment into the sector. 
 
How independent do you find the 
regulator? 
 
Whilst by law there is apparent 
independence of the Regulator, in 
practice this is severely curtailed by the 
exercise of appointive powers exercised 
by the line Ministry as well as directives 
(both on policy and procedure) affecting 
the adjudication of matters coming under 
the purview of the Regulator. Rarely 
would the Regulator pass any crucial 
decisions within their remit without 
seeking the approval or acquiescence of 
the line Ministry.   
 
How many IPPs have you funded since 
2002? 
 
We have positively considered and 
appraised three (3) IPP projects which 
up to now have not yet reached financial 
close. 
 
Have you been funding Zesa projects and 
if so how much? 
 
Yes we have funded ZESA projects. 
Total cumulative funding is circa 
US$110million.  
 
Does the structure where ZPC and 
ZETDC are both under Zesa Holdings 
compromise dispatch fairness between 
IPPs and ZPC? 
 
ZPC and ZETDC are related parties. By 
this fact alone, rarely would their 
dealings with each other on dispatch and 
other crucial off-take parameters on grid 
access be completely at arm’s length as 
would be the case for IPPs. This may 
even extend to pricing of wheeling 
charges as well as prioritization of 
access, which in all probability will be 
skewed in favour of a sister company 
ZPC ahead of a privately owned IPP. 
 
How much have you invested in the ESI? 
 
Our cumulative investment to date could 
be approximately US$150million, taking 
into account para. (7) above. 
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Is there anything you think should be 
done to enhance the attractiveness of the 
ESI? 
 
The single-buyer market for grid off-take 
should be done away with through 
liberalization, so as to render the national 
grid open to all producers. In addition, 
tariff policy should be opened so that it is 
fully cost reflective and offers a 
competitive return to an investor in ESI. 
The Regulator should act autonomously, 
and independently arbitrate on tariff 
applications based on sound business and 
market considerations, and not social 
safety guards born from external 
pressures exerted by political principals. 
The power utility should be fully 
unbundled and the market should be 
liberalized further in order to attract 
significant investment from the private 
sector in the mainstream aspects of ESI 
where fiscal support is coming short. 
 
 
 
Respondent Bank3 
Question Response 
What is your mandate in as far as 
infrastructure development is 
concerned? 
Funding of infrastructure projects with a 
primary objective of eradicating poverty 
 
How have you been involved in 
the power sector? 
Greenfield investment and rehabilitation 
projects 
What structural issues of ESI do 
you consider when you want to 
invest in the ESI? 
 
The funding of any ESI project has to enhance 
sustainability of the sector. AfDB is not lending 
to the sector in Zimbabwe because government 
is in arrears with repayment of loans. It is 
understood the economic performance at large 
has hampered the ability of government to repay 
the loans. Poverty eradication is driving grants in 
the economy. Donor funds are used for the 
projects. 
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How attractive do you find the 
reforms of 2002 to investment? 
 
Efficiency is compromised where the sector 
seems top heavy. The Holding company does not 
seem to be adding enough value through its role 
of housing legacy debt and facilitating intra-
sector trade. 
 
How independent do you think the 
regulator is? 
 
Before the regulator, government would approve 
tariff through parliament. IPPs would charge 
85% of retail tariff. Regulator is independent 
from the view of the bank. They have proved 
through rejection of tariff increase. Political 
interference cannot be ruled out though. 
 
How many IPPs have you funded 
in the sector? 
 
There has been engagement but no funding has 
been advanced yet. The bank prioritizes public 
sector in Zimbabwe. The private sector fund 
faces challenges of the wider economic 
environment which is constrained. 
 
Have you been funding ZESA 
projects and if so how much? 
 
Only through grants but no loans.  
Does the structure where ZPC and 
ZETDC are both under Zesa 
Holdings compromise dispatch 
fairness between IPPs and ZPC? 
It would compromise to the extent that these are 
sister companies working to improve the bottom 
line of the group. 
 
Is there anything you think should 
be done to enhance the 
attractiveness of the ESI? 
Government has to support revenue collection 
efforts by the utility as well as ensure the tariff is 
cost reflective, preferably through reducing costs 
 
Any structural changes you may 
suggest? 
 
Advancing reform to enhance choice of supplier 
by the customer is awaited. The bank 
recommends removal of ZESA Holdings, as its 
value addition is not convincing. Transmission 
and Distribution should also be separated.  
 
Appendix 2 
Informed Consent Agreement 
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Informed Consent Agreement 
Please read this consent agreement carefully before you decide to participate in the 
study. 
Purpose of the Agreement: This agreement is meant to receive official consent of 
participating organizations in the research study. It is the requirement of the University of 
Cape Town that this Agreement be signed by the participating organizations before any 
research commences.  
Identity of the Researcher:  The name of the researcher is Howard Choga. He is in the second 
and final year of a Master of Commerce degree in Development Finance with the University 
of Cape Town. In partial fulfilment of the requirements of this degree programme, he is 
required to carry out a research project. 
Project Title: The reform of the Electricity Supply Industry in Zimbabwe and its impact on the 
power sector investment since 2002. 
Purpose of the research study: The purpose of the study is to investigate whether the 
Electricity sector reforms have had any impact on investment in the sector since 2002.  
What participants will do in the study:  The participants in this study are expected to respond 
to questionnaire and interview questions honestly and to the best of their knowledge and 
experience, how the electricity supply industry has been impacted by the 2002 reforms as 
revised and reviewed to date. Participants will not be photographed, audio-tapped or video-
taped. If any participant feels uncomfortable with any question in the survey, they are free to 
contact the researcher or stop the survey altogether. The researcher assures the participants 
that there will be no consequences at all to any participants should they decide to take such 
action on the research.  
Time required: The study will require about 10 minutes of your time for questionnaire and 
20 minutes for interview. Only completion of this questionnaire will be all the time required 
to complete the study. 
Risks: There are no anticipated risks to the participants in this study.  
Benefits: There are no direct benefits to you for participating in this research study.  The study 
may help us understand the effectiveness of the Electricity Supply Industry reforms as 
implemented from 2002 to date.   
Confidentiality: The data collected from participants will be used only for the purposes of the 
study and will be confidential. Only the analysis of the collected data will be submitted in a 
dissertation report to the University of Cape Town. The collected data will be destroyed after 
the final submission of the report by end of December 2016.  
Voluntary participation: Your participation in the study is completely voluntary. It is 
acknowledged that the researcher is an executive in Zimbabwe Electricity Transmission and 
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Distribution Company, which is a critical player in the industry. It is emphasized that the 
treatment of the participants and their organizations will not be affected in any way by their 
participation in this study.  
Right to withdraw from the study: You have the right to withdraw from the study at any time 
without penalty or any consequences. 
How to withdraw from the study: If the participant feels for any reason, which may not 
necessarily have to be stated, that they want to withdraw from the study, they can freely do 
so by not submitting a completed form and/or notifying the researcher of their decision not 
to participate. If the questionnaire would have been submitted, the questionnaire will be 
withdrawn on notification of intention to withdraw from participation by the participant 
provided that the questionnaire is not anonymous enough to make identification of the 
submitted questionnaire difficult. 
If you want to withdraw from the study, you can do so by either emailing the researcher on 
chghow001@gsb.uct.ac.za or phoning the researcher on +263772244917. There are no 
penalties or any consequences for withdrawing. If you would like to withdraw after your 
materials have been submitted, please contact the researcher on the same details above.  
Payment: You will receive no payment for participating in the study.  
If you have questions about the study, contact the Researcher: 
Name:   Howard Choga 
Mobile phone number: +263772244917 
Email address:  chghow001@gsb.uct.ac.za  
 
Agreement: 
I agree to participate in the research study described above. 
Signature:   _____________________________ Date: ___________________ 
For and on behalf of:  
_________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________
__________(Name of Company) 
Signature:     (Researcher) Date: ___________________ 
You will receive a copy of this agreement for your records. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3 
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Coded responses from IPPs 
IPP Interviews 
codes 
            
Question 
Resp IPP1 Resp IPP2 Resp IPP3 Resp IPP4 Resp IPP5 Resp IPP6 
How many power 
stations do you 
own? 
one one one Five one One 
What technologies 
do you use for 
power generation? 
Thermal Thermal Thermal Mini hydro Thermal Biomass 
What influenced 
the idea? 
Shortfall Shortfall Shortfall Self supply Shortfall Shortfall 
How much have 
you invested so 
far? 
$12m $8m $20m $40m $6m $1m 
What is your view 
of the 
independence of 
the Regulator? 
Not 
independent 
Fairly 
independent 
Not 
Independent 
Fairly 
independent 
Independent Fairly 
independent 
How do you view 
the PPA 
negotiation 
process? 
Fair Fair  Fair Good Time 
consuming 
Not 
applicable 
Tariff negotiation 
process and tariff 
methodology 
Fair Acceptable Acceptable Good Time 
consuming. 
Metholdology 
is good 
Not 
applicable 
Payment for 
delivered power 
Not 
operational 
Not 
operational 
Not 
operational 
Paid on time Not 
operational 
Self supply 
PPA securitization 
requirements 
Escrow 
account, 
Government 
guarantee 
Escrow 
account, 
Government 
guarantee 
Escrow 
account, 
Government 
guarantee 
Escrow 
account 
Offtaker 
bankability 
Not 
applicable 
Challenges in the 
initial stages of the 
project. 
Shareholder 
changes 
Mining 
concession, 
Generation 
license 
Coal 
mining/Dam 
construction 
approval 
Load 
shedding of 
imbedded 
generator 
PPA 
finalisation 
Funding 
What do you think 
the challenges of 
the off-taker are, 
and how can this 
be fixed? 
Revenue 
collection 
Balance 
sheet, 
revenue 
collection, 
demand 
growth 
Revenue 
collection, 
transfer 
pricing 
Economic 
environment 
Balance sheet, 
funding and 
revenue 
collection. 
Non 
payment for 
power 
delivered 
What do you see 
as the greatest 
challenges in 
investing in the 
Zimbabwean 
power sector?  
Ease of doing 
business 
Country risk Ease of doing 
business 
Risk 
perception 
not realistic 
payment risk, 
economic 
environment 
Funding 
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How do financiers 
view the reformed 
structure of the 
sector in terms of 
attractiveness?  
Not properly 
aligned 
Attractive Not properly 
aligned 
Reform 
properly 
structured 
the sector 
Sector 
properly 
structured, no 
rule of law. 
Little 
attractive 
What challenges 
do you think your 
competitors are 
facing?  
Funding Funding Funding Funding Funding Funding 
What advice would 
you give to 
someone who 
would want to 
invest in the 
sector?  
Invest Invest Invest Invest Invest invest but 
carefully 
 
 
Banks interviews       
Question Resp Bank1 Resp Bank2 Resp Bank3 
What is your mandate in 
as far as infrastructure 
development is 
concerned? 
Infrastructure is core 
and theme 
Statutory 
mandate 
Funding 
infrastructure to 
eradicate 
poverty 
How have you been 
involved in the power 
sector? 
Corporate banking Funded prepaid 
meters and 
repowering of 
power stations 
Greenfield and 
rehabilitation 
projects 
What structural issues of 
ESI do you consider when 
you want to invest in the 
ESI? 
Sustainability, tariff, 
revenue collection, 
Environmental 
issues. 
Bankability of off-
taker, single 
buyer model not 
good, Regulator 
independence 
Sustainability 
How attractive do you find 
the reforms of 2002 to 
investment? 
Sector always 
attractive as it can 
never go under 
Structure is good 
but was not fully 
implemented 
Zesa Holdings 
compromising 
attractiveness. 
How independent do you 
find the regulator? 
Compromised Independent at 
law not in 
practice 
Independent 
though there is 
political 
interference 
How many IPPs have you 
funded since 2002? 
One 3 who have not 
yet reached 
financial closure 
Fund public 
sector only. 
Have you been funding 
Zesa projects and if so 
how much? 
Yes. Corporate loans Yes. $110m Only through 
grants 
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Does the structure where 
ZPC and ZETDC are both 
under Zesa Holdings 
compromise dispatch 
fairness between IPPs and 
ZPC? 
No adverse reports. 
No compromise 
Greatly 
compromised. 
Compromised 
How much have you 
invested in the ESI? 
ZAR500m +$10m $150m incl Zesa   
Is there anything you think 
should be done to 
enhance the 
attractiveness of the ESI? 
Tariff should be cost 
reflective 
Do away with 
single buyer 
model, cost 
reflective tariff, 
independent 
regulator, fully 
unbundle ESI 
Cost reflective 
tariff, revenue 
collection 
 
ZPC   
Question   
When were you unbundled out of the 
vertically integrated ZESA? 
2003 
How did the reforms of 2002 affect the 
operations of ZPC? 
PPA with ZETDC 
What were the objectives of the 
reforms? 
Allow IPPs, 
Regulator 
How did the reforms affect your access 
to capital? 
Only ZPC balance 
shhet to support 
access to capital 
How fair do you find the regulator on 
issues to do with the off-taker, IPPs 
and yourselves? 
Largely 
independent 
How many power stations have you 
managed to build since reforms and 
how many MW have you managed to 
add to the grid? 
None built. Kariba 
extension 
commissioning 
2018 adding 
300MW 
Are you being paid for the power 
delivered?  
Not paid in full. 
Over $700m owed 
Is ZETDC not paying all producers or 
it’s selectively ZPC, and why? 
IPPs paid in full. 
IPPs are small and 
ZETDC has to 
What is the impact on non-payment?  
Maintenance not 
done,frequent 
breakdowns. 
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What mechanism would you think best 
applies to ensuring payment? 
Escrow accounts, 
LCs 
 
ZETDC   
Question   
How has the reform of 2002 affected the 
operations of the off-taker? 
power quality awareness 
How active has been the development of 
power sources since reforms? 
Just small IPPs 
How are the dispatch arrangements of 
generation companies, and are they 
successful arrangements? 
Economic order dispatch. Successful 
How many IPPs are you dispatching now, and 
how many MW are they contributing? 
9 IPPs giving 30MW 
What aspects of the reform are supportive to 
the off-taker’s access to capital? 
Ring fenced off-taker risks 
The transmission company and distribution 
company were initially separate. What 
motivated their bundling? 
Economy too small to have them 
separate 
Are the reforms conducive to investment in 
the generation subsector? 
Conducive 
Is the Regulator independent?  Legally independent but practically not 
Have you been able to collect all the revenue 
billed? If not, how much is owed? 
No. Government protects errand 
consumers 
How has the debtors’ book size affected your 
ability to securitize PPAs for IPPs? 
Very negative effect 
How do you securitize? 
Gvt guarantee for investments and 
Escrow account for IPPs 
What securitization measures have you been 
able to implement to ensure securitization of 
PPAs and how successful have they been? 
Assignment of customers has been 
hugely successful 
 
 
ZERA   
Question   
How was regulation of ESI achieved prior 
to formation of ZERC in 2002? 
ZESA was the regulator 
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What motivated the ESI reforms of 2002? 
Government needed investment in 
generation 
What is your view of the structure of the 
reformed ESI, the companies formed and 
their interrelationship as a group? 
It is work in progress as companies 
ultimately have to separate. 
How independent is the regulator? Not practically independent 
What issues in the ESI do you think need 
to be regulated? 
Licensing, Tariff, safety, operations, 
power quality 
Have all these issues had policies put in 
place to regulate the ESI? 
Not all yet 
How easy is it for industry players to 
comply? 
Easy 
How much do you think reform has 
affected the investment climate? 
Created interest but no significant 
invrestment 
What was the motivation behind the 
formation of ZERA from ZERC? 
To avoid having another regulator for 
petroleum 
Was it a good move in your view? Yes 
Has regulation been enhanced as a 
result? 
Yes 
How many licensees are there to date?   
How much power has been added to the 
grid since reforms? 
  
How much money has been invested 
since the 2002 reforms? 
  
 
 
 
 
MoEPD   
Question   
What were the objectives of the 
reform of 2002? 
To allow IPPs 
What was the rationale of the 
merging of Transmission and 
Distribution companies in 2007? 
Reduce staff costs 
How independent is the regulator?  Not so independent 
What is the envisaged reform process 
by government?  
Totally separate generation, 
transmission and distribution. 
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How far has the reform process 
gone?  
No meaningful progress 
The current state of having ZESA 
Holdings does not take the off-taker 
far away enough to assure IPPs that 
there will not be dispatch favoritism 
of ZPC. What are your views on that?  
Off-taker not compromised 
Why was the electricity act of 2013 
not implemented?  
The economic environment was not yet 
conducive 
What are the government’s views on 
the perennial loss-making position of 
off-taker? 
Planning to move to cost reflective tariff 
gradually. 
What is the impact of the off-taker 
being owed over USD1 billion by 
consumers? 
Compromise in service delivery 
How has private capital responded to 
the reforms of the ESI?  
There is not much in terms of 
implemented projects 
What is the procurement process of 
prospective IPPs on the System 
Development Plan (SDP)?  
Unsolicited bids 
Before the reforms there were IPPs. 
How were IPPs regulated before the 
2002 ESI reforms?  
By ZESA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4 
Survey Questionnaire 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
My name is Howard Choga and I am in the second and final year of a Master of Commerce 
degree in Development Finance with the University of Cape Town. In partial fulfilment of the 
requirements of this degree programme, I am required to carry out a research project. The topic 
of my dissertation is “The reform of the Electricity Supply Industry in Zimbabwe and its 
impact on investment since 2002.” 
 
I kindly request to share your experience and knowledge of the electricity supply industry and 
the impact of the 2002 and subsequent reforms on investment in the sector.  
 
This research has been approved by the Commerce Faculty Ethics in Research Committee. 
Your participation in this research is voluntary. You can choose to withdraw from the 
research at any time. The questionnaire will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. You 
will not be requested to supply any personal identifiable information, ensuring anonymity of 
your responses.    
 
Due to the nature of the study you will need to provide the researcher with some form of 
identifiable information about the investment. However, all responses will be confidential 
and used for the purposes of this research only. Should you have any questions regarding the 
research please feel free to contact the researcher  
Name:   Howard Choga 
Email address: chghow001@gsb.uct.ac.za 
   howardchoga@gmail.com 
Mobile number: +263772244917   
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1.0 Introduction and background 
 
1.1 At what stage of development is your power station. 
Concept/Pre-feasibility stage  
Feasibility study/Proof of bankability  
Funding  
Construction  
Opertional  
  
 
1.2 What technology are you using for power generation. 
Hydro  
Mini hydro  
Coal  
Bagasse  
Gas  
Other (Specify) …………………………….  
 
 
 
 
2.0 Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) reforms 
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2.1 What is your understanding of the electricity sector with regard to the reforms, 
electricity pricing and system development issues? 
 Excellent 
 Good 
 Average 
 Poor 
 No knowledge at all 
  
2.2 How do you rate the level of independence of the regulator? 
 Excellent 
 Good 
 Average 
 Poor 
 Very poor 
 
2.3 How easy is it to go through the licencing process? 
 Excellent 
 Good 
 Average 
 Poor 
 No knowledge at all 
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2.4 How easy is it to go through the power purchase agreement negotiation 
process? 
 Excellent 
 Good 
 Average 
 Poor 
 No knowledge at all 
 
 
2.5 How was the IPP awarded contract to develop the power plant?  
 Unsolicited bid 
 Expansion of own assets 
 Won a tender 
 
 
